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ABSTRACT 
An important part of the homeland security enterprise is the ability of public officials and 
leaders to communicate effectively with the public. When a crisis strikes, the public’s 
ability to understand and act upon messages provided by officials is often significantly 
impinged by anxiety, fear, worry and distrust. In these uncertain and traumatic times, the 
public looks for a trusted voice and steady leadership. The ability to be trusted and lead 
during a crisis is determined, largely, by how well an official communicates with those 
affected. 
This thesis examines the public information methods used by officials in two 
high-profile criminal cases that unfolded before live television news cameras over the 
course of several days in 2013—the Boston Marathon bombings and the nine-day 
manhunt for former Los Angeles Police Department Officer Christopher Dorner in the 
greater southern California area. 
Best practices in risk and crisis communication are identified through a review of 
the literature and are used as the basis for analyzing each case study. The findings lead to 
four key crisis communication recommendations for public officials: recognizing the 
importance of empathy and compassion in trust building, focusing specifically on crisis 
communication best practices for leadership, emphasizing the importance of building pre-
event partnerships, and differentiating the tactics from the strategic. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The tragedy that we are undergoing right now is something that we’ve had 
nightmares about. My heart goes out to all the innocent victims of this 
horrible and vicious act of terrorism. And our focus now has to be to save 
as many lives as possible. 
– Rudolph W. Giuliani, Mayor of New York City 
September 11, 2001 
 
In uncertain, traumatic and fearful times, the public looks for a trusted voice and steady 
leadership. The ability to be trusted and lead during a crisis is determined, largely, by 
how well an official communicates with those affected. Specifically, gaining people’s 
trust is particularly important to motivate people to take critical actions in an alarming, 
confusing, rapidly changing, or high concern/consequence event. This trust can be 
difficult for leaders, first responders and public spokespersons to achieve because often 
their untrained instinct in a crisis situation is to provide matter-of-fact details about the 
crisis, and miss other key elements that emerge from executing a comprehensive crisis 
communication strategy. 
This thesis examined two high profile crises that unfolded before live television 
cameras in 2013, The Boston Marathon bombings and the Christopher Dorner manhunt 
and murders. These represent two similar man-made disasters in which the individuals 
responsible continue to injure and kill over the course of several days. The public 
statements made by officials in the heat of the crisis had the potential to influence the 
killers and reduce or increase the death toll. Therefore, the researcher used these events as 
an opportunity to look closely at the methods of communication used and analyze their 
effectiveness. Specifically, the researcher sought answers to the question: What can we 
learn from the deconstruction of crisis communication by public officials in unfolding, 
high consequence events?  
Specifically, this paper focused on six main principles from the literature that 
formed the foundation for relevant best practices in crisis communication during 
unfolding and ongoing incidents similar to those examined in this paper: 1) building and 
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maintaining trust, 2) delivery of timely messages and information, 3) conducting 
effective news conferences, 4) guiding and encouraging appropriate attitudes, decisions, 
actions and behaviors, 5) coordinate, collaborate and act in partnership with other 
credible sources, and 6) advanced planning and practice.  
In the first case study, the tragic events and unprecedented manhunt for 
Christopher Dorner created extraordinary challenges for law enforcement in the Southern 
California region. The discovery of his online manifesto provided fuel for a dramatic, 
uncontrolled storyline by members of the news media, and created a level of fear that 
permeated deeply within the law enforcement community. When the Los Angeles police 
chief described the evolving situation as “…extremely worrisome and scary, especially to 
the police officers involved…” early in the manhunt, it signaled the seriousness of the 
unfolding threat to the community; a rapidly evolving threat that resulted in quick action 
by law enforcement throughout the region. However, officials experienced difficulty in 
coordination among the multiple agencies and did not employ existing protocols, such as 
the mutual aid system, often used for fire related activities. The use of empathy in 
primary public messaging, a significant component necessary for building trust, was not 
prevalent in the beginning and the multitude of agencies involved were not consistent in 
coordinated messaging. However, information dissemination was provided in a timely 
manner, and when the mayor of Los Angeles announced a $1 million reward, a deliberate 
display of unity among jurisdictions provided a significant show of coordination and 
effort on behalf of more than just law enforcement. 
In the second case study, public safety officials in Boston faced the challenge of 
responding to a plausible worst-case scenario of terrorism at a highly public, large-scale 
event. The premeditated attack on innocent people at the Boston Marathon finish line, 
and deadly manhunt that followed, caused a prolonged heightened level of fear and 
uncertainty in the greater Boston area—arguably on a similar, but distinctly different, 
level as the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The pressure on law enforcement to 
identify those responsible and apprehend them as quickly as possible was tremendous. 
The researched showed that pre-existing relationships and exercises appeared to 
contribute to a well-coordinated response and public display of unified leadership. 
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Information was provided in a timely manner; however, an early instance of speculation 
by officials turned out to be inaccurate. The Boston Police Department provided timely 
information when it resorted to using Twitter when its news blog crashed, which became 
a watershed moment that evidenced an effective use of social media in high profile 
incidents. Boston officials use of empathy in primary public messaging, a significant 
component necessary for building trust, was also not prevalent in the beginning. 
The research and case studies in this thesis provided valuable real-world insight 
into the complexities and challenges of communicating during a high profile crisis and 
led the researcher to provide some specific recommendations for public officials and 
organizations likely to face similar events in the future. Those faced with the challenges 
and demands of high profile, high consequence events are certain to be judged more by 
their success at communicating effectively before, during, and after the crisis than by 
how well they handle the tactical response.  
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In uncertain, traumatic and fearful times, the public looks for a trusted voice and 
steady leadership. The ability to be trusted and lead during a crisis is determined, largely, 
by how well an official communicates with those affected. One of the best examples of 
an effective crisis communicator amidst a catastrophic event was former New York 
Major Rudy Giuliani during the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. His authentic, 
empathic, and reassuring presence before the news media following the attacks 
transcended politics, introducing the nation to someone it could trust. Shortly after the 
first tower collapsed, killing hundreds more than were lost in the original jetliner 
collisions, the mayor appeared before television cameras at a press conference alongside 
then New York Governor George Pataki. “Today is obviously one of the most difficult 
days in the history of the city,” said Mayor Giuliani. “The tragedy that we are undergoing 
right now is something that we’ve had nightmares about. My heart goes out to all the 
innocent victims of this horrible and vicious act of terrorism. And our focus now has to 
be to save as many lives as possible.”1 
In contrast to then-President George W. Bush who was swept away by Secret 
Service and inaccessible in the first few hours, Mayor Giuliani was leading not only 
worried New Yorkers, but also the rest of the country. Long before this catastrophe, 
Giuliani had mastered the skills of an effective crisis communicator that gave him the 
ability to put them to use when the nation needed them the most. In his book Leadership, 
Giuliani describes the preparation he and his administration had conducted for the 
inevitable crisis that unfolded on September 11. “As shocking as the crash was, we had 
actually planning for such a catastrophe. My administration had built a state-of-the-art 
command center, from which we handled the emergencies that inevitably befall a city 
like New York.”2 He and his executives would routinely practice the methods of crisis 
                                                 
1 CNN.com, “New York’s Governor and Mayor of New York City Address Concerns of the Damage,” 
September 11, 2001, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/11/bn.42.html 
2 Rudolph W. Giuliani and Ken Kurson, Leadership (New York: Hyperion, 2002), 119. 
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communication in non-crisis times, such as at executive staff meetings and exercises, to 
ensure they were ready to provide public information in the most effective way.  
A New York Times story in 2007 explained, “A leader must weave a narrative of 
shared loss while acknowledging consuming anger. All this Mr. Giuliani accomplished, 
mourning the dead, comforting the grieving and cheering the living even as the police 
and the National Guard moved in.”3 The result of using effective risk and crisis 
communication during a crisis is an informed public that is more likely to make rational 
decisions, take actions to remain safe and contribute to the overall well being of others. In 
contrast, ill-informed members of the public unable to find a trusted source of official 
information are more likely to make irrational, selfish decisions that lead to unnecessary 
fear, anxiety and worse outcomes. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Gaining people’s trust is particularly important to motivate people to take life-
safety actions in an alarming, confusing, rapidly changing, or high concern/consequence 
event. This trust can be difficult for first responders and public spokespersons to achieve 
because often their untrained instinct in a crisis situation is to provide matter-of-fact 
details about the crisis, and miss other key elements that emerge from executing a 
comprehensive crisis communication strategy. It is known from research that people 
under stress or fear are affected by their negativity bias—in that, they are more 
powerfully influenced by negative information than by consoling, reassuring positive 
information.4 In addition, those experiencing a crisis will rely on their affective heuristic, 
wherein they use their emotions, often disproportionately, to make decisions.5 One 
decision critically important to them is determining whom to trust. 
                                                 
3 Michael Powell, “In 9/11 Chaos, Guiliani Forged a Lasting Image,” New York Times, September 21, 
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/21/us/politics/21giuliani.html. 
4 James N. Breckenridge and Philip G. Zimbardo, “The Strategy of Terrorism and the Psychology of 
Mass-mediated Fear,” Naval Postgraduate School, accessed December 20, 2013, https://www.chds.us/ 
courses/mod/resource/view.php?id=73341; Paul Rozin and Edward B. Royzman, “Negativity Bias, 
Negativity Dominance, and Contagion,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 5 (2001): 296–320. 
5 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” 
Science 185, no. 4157 (1974): 1124–1131. 
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For example, a study was conducted that focused on people who lived around 
Mount St. Helens in Washington State in 1980 when it experienced the most catastrophic 
volcanic eruption in U.S. history. Researchers concluded that a significant relationship 
existed between the belief and trust in the source of a warning (e.g., public officials) and 
taking action.6 Experts described the amount of foreknowledge and warning for this 
volcanic eruption as greater than any previous geologic hazard in history. Numerous 
warnings surely reduced the death toll; however, many people remained skeptical of 
officials and unconvinced of the danger. As a result, 60 individuals lost their lives, many 
of whom could have heeded repeated warnings and escaped the danger if they trusted the 
officials issuing the warnings. 
1. Public Concerns Mostly Driven By Perceptions 
A common misperception by public officials facing a crisis situation is the need to 
appear knowledgeable during public statements by providing lots of facts and figures 
(e.g., number of casualties, homes burned, fire trucks firefighters at the scene, shelters 
open, police officers investigating, time of incident, etc.), as they believe that will reduce 
stress and anxiety. However, according to research described below, public concerns 
typically are based 95 percent on perceptions and only 5 percent on facts. People’s 
behavior usually is predicated on perceptions—often misperceptions—that differ 
substantially from reality (facts),7 which is a critical distinction highlighting the 
difference between what people need to hear when they are stressed and what public 
officials actually say, or do not say, when a crisis strikes.8 
Consequently, a dangerous disconnect can occur between how public officials 
actually communicate in a crisis, and their awareness and understanding of the unique 
skills and techniques needed to prompt consequential, life saving actions by those 
affected. Therefore, officials who “wing it,” rather than using proven techniques of risk 
                                                 
6 Ronald W. Perry and Marjorie Greene, Citizen Response to Volcanic Eruptions: The Case of Mt. St. 
Helens (New York, NY: Irvington Publishers, 1983). 
7 Center for Risk Communication, “Determination of Trust,” December 10, 2013, 
http://centerforriskcommunication.org/environmental-risk-communications/. 
8 Vincent Covello and Peter M. Sandman, “Risk Communication: Evolution and Revolution,” 
Solutions to an Environment in Peril (2001): 164–178. 
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and crisis communication, are often less effective; some even risk making the situation 
worse. Conversely, numerous case studies have shown that officials who practice learned 
risk and crisis communication techniques are more likely to build trust and become an 
effective response and mitigation tool for those managing a disaster.9 
2. History As a Guide 
It is not necessary to look far back in history to appreciate the perils of poor 
public communication in a crisis. In July 2012, a 641-page report authored by an 
independent 10-member panel, issued a stinging rebuke of the Japanese government, 
bureaucratic regulators, and Tokyo Electric Power Company, which had been widely 
criticized for sluggish action and the release of inaccurate information in the hours and 
days following the disaster at the Fukushima nuclear power plant in 2011. “Only 20 
percent of the residents of the town hosting the plant knew about the accident when 
evacuation from the 3km zone was ordered at 21:23 on the evening of March 11.”10 Two 
months after the disaster, a nationwide poll showed 81 percent of respondents to the 
survey said they did not trust government information about the crisis. Seventy-eight 
percent said then Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan lacked leadership in handling the 
disaster.11 
When an explosion killed 11 men and injured 17 others on a drilling platform in 
the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, leading to the worst environmental disaster in U.S. history, 
the man in charge at the time was widely criticized for not only lacking empathy, but also 
repeatedly failing to express it. His most famous statement was made as thousands of 
gallons of crude oil continued to gush into the ocean unabated. “I’m sorry. We’re sorry 
for the massive disruption it’s caused their lives,” said BP CEO Tony Hayward while 
touring the coast wearing a neatly pressed Oxford shirt. “There’s no one who wants this 
                                                 
9 Robert R. Ulmer, Timothy L. Sellnow, and Matthew W. Seeger, eds., Effective Crisis 
Communication: Moving from Crisis to Opportunity (Sage Publications, 2010). 
10 National Diet Library, The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, 
“Japan Diet Fukushima Report,” July 2012, http://naiic.go.jp/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/NAIIC_report_ 
lo_res.pdf. 




over more than I do. I’d like my life back.”12 Although Hayward may have been trying to 
assure the public he would do everything possible to stop the oil from leaking into the 
ocean, his choice of words portrayed himself as a victim rather than a trustworthy leader 
of the emergency response. 
At some of the top business schools across the country, Hayward’s catastrophic 
mistakes have become the focus of case studies and classroom discussion.13 In addition 
to lessons on executive leadership, Hayward provides several explicit examples of why 
letting people know you care matters. His statement sent a message of insensitivity, 
selfishness, and detachment to the public and those affected by the spill. “The words 
made many families feel that Hayward and BP simply didn’t care. Hayward just needed 
to use a little more empathy in public,” said Peter Topping, associate professor of 
organization and management at Emory University.  
3. Effects—Acute Stress Disorders 
Generally speaking, it is known that those exposed to a traumatic event show 
increased rates of acute stress disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), major 
depression, panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and substance use disorder. 
Victims of intentional terrorist acts often cope with loss using a harm/loss appraisal, thus 
experiencing a high level of stress, fear, and likely anger in that moment.14 Consequently, 
the length and severity of stress and outlook on the future can be direct affected by the 
presence or absence of psychological support.15 Public officials can demonstrate that 
support, in part, through effective risk and crisis communication. 
An interesting study was conducted two weeks after the Boston Marathon 
bombings on April 15, 2013. Researchers surveyed residents in Boston, New York, and 
                                                 
12 The Huffington Post, “BP CEO Tony Hayward (VIDEO): ‘I’d Like My Life Back,’” June 1, 2010, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/01/bp-ceo-tony-hayward-video_n_595906.html. 
13 Stephanie Chen, “Crisis Management 101: What Can BP CEO Hayward’s Mistakes Teach Us?” 
CNN.com, July 27, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/LIVING/07/27/bp.tony.hayward.mistakes/index.html. 
14 Bruce Michael Bongar, Psychology of Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 175–93. 
15 National Research Council, Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism: A Public 
Health Strategy (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2003). 
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the remainder of the United States to determine the media’s role in broadcasting acute 
stress following the bombings. They examined whether repeated media exposure to the 
Boston Marathon bombings was associated with acute stress and compared the impact of 
direct exposure (being at or near the bombings) vs. media exposure (bombing-related 
television, radio, print, online, and social media coverage) on acute stress. Interestingly, 
their findings support the conclusion that six or more daily hours of exposure to media 
coverage of the Boston Marathon bombings in the week afterward was linked to more 
acute stress than having been at or near the marathon. Acute stress symptoms increased 
with each additional hour of bombing-related media exposure via television, social 
media, videos, print, or radio.16 
High-profile incidents that receive national media exposure also tend to attract 
and involve more than the typical career public safety leaders (e.g., police and fire chiefs, 
sheriffs, emergency managers). Elected officials are sought after by the media as leaders 
and representatives of the people affected. As was witnessed in previous disasters, they 
often overshadow the front-line public safety officials despite the latter’s greater 
relevance in the crisis. Some may argue that elected officials, specifically, should focus 
on “politics” and stay out of the way of emergency managers, but the reality is that 
elected officials often feel compelled to take a highly visible “leadership” role in a 
disaster even if there is not a specifically defined one in an operational structure. Often, 
this compulsion appears to be motivated by other factors, such as ego, enhancing 
electability, and gaining public stature or advocating for unrelated political objectives that 
must be factored into the risk and crisis communication strategy used if officials want to 
maximize the effectiveness of their public dialogue. 
4. Perceived High-Profile Consequences 
When faced with a crisis that gains significant public exposure or calls for the 
public to take action, standard methods are typically used to release information to the 
public, such as press releases, press conferences, one-on-one interviews, and public 
                                                 
16 UCIrvine News, “Prolonged Viewing of Boston Marathon Bombings Media Coverage Tied to 
Acute Stress,” 2014, http://news.uci.edu/press-releases/prolonged-viewing-of-boston-marathon-bombings-
media-coverage-tied-to-acute-stress/. 
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forums. The focus typically centers on a written document called a “press release,” or 
“news release,” or a scheduled appearance before members of the news media called a 
“news conference.” Some officials see these as high-risk events within a critical incident, 
where a misstatement or inability to address a journalist’s tough question adequately 
could negatively impact that official’s career. For this reason, critical information is often 
not timely. A hyper-focus on risk managing the potential negative consequences of what 
they say trumps the urgency and opportunity to provide public information. Alternatively, 
others view appearances before the media and public as their opportunity to achieve the 
proverbial 15 minutes of fame. 
Conversely, elected officials are more are likely to have experience in working 
with the media and public as a part of their routine election process. Since they are 
independent of any controlling agency, such as a police or fire department, they rarely 
have formal policies specific to how to communicate during emergencies. They are also 
more likely to have experience in public relations as opposed to specific training in risk 
and crisis communication. 
5. Inconsistent Emphasis on Public Information Function 
Public safety agencies are more likely to have policies on how to provide public 
information during a crisis. These policies typically focus on the procedures to create and 
distribute information products, such as news releases and official statements. Their 
intent is to ensure the agency complies with laws, such as the Freedom of Information 
Act or, in the case of California, the California Public Records Act.  
However, having a crisis communication policy that ensures compliance with 
laws and regulations is not the same thing as having a strategic crisis communication 
plan. In a survey of members of the Major Cities Chiefs Association in March 2011, 55 
percent of those who responded said their agency did not have a strategic 
communications plan even though they used many methods to communicate with the 
public.17 Many law enforcement agencies have designated public information officers 
                                                 
17 Darrel W. Stephens and Julia Hill, Strategic Communication Practices: A Toolkit for Police 
Executives, U.S. Department of Justice, 2012, 57. 
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(PIO) trained in media relations and public information laws. However, smaller agencies 
that lack adequate staff are more likely to designate someone as a PIO who is not full-
time and may not possess any formal training. In some cases, the culture of the agency 
may be to take a posture of “deny, justify, and stonewall” instead of providing critical 
information during a crisis.18  
The convergence of public safety officials and elected leaders during a crisis often 
leads to inconsistencies because of differing levels of training and experience, and 
assumptions about how to handle a crisis. Leaders may decide not to follow existing 
procedures because the event is extraordinary. The heightened public attention may also 
create the perception that they need to take extraordinary actions that are outside existing 
policies and procedures.  
Therefore, research and previous case studies suggest it is critically important that 
officials employ consistent and proven risk and crisis communication methods and 
techniques in high profile, high consequence events. The application of which increases 
the chances of reducing the public’s innate distrust of those managing disasters, and 
increases their likelihood that life saving messages will be persuasive and convincing. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Emergency management officials and leaders often commission in depth case 
studies on critical incidents and disasters to identify how well they responded and the 
areas upon which they can improve. Numerous “after action” analyses are available 
concerning large-scale disasters, such as Hurricanes Sandy, Katrina, the Northridge 
earthquake in 1994 and other catastrophic events throughout the world. These reports are 
typically used as a basis for changing or improving government practices to better serve 
those who depend on them the most in a crisis. The same is true for “man-made” 
disasters, such as the Oklahoma City Bombing, terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, 
and other mass killings throughout the United States.  
                                                 
18 Chuck Wexler, Mary Ann Wycoff, and Craig Fischer, Good to Great” Policing: Application of 
Business Management Principles in the Public Sector (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office 
of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2007), 48. 
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The Boston Marathon bombings and the Christopher Dorner manhunt and 
murders in 2013 represent two similar man-made disasters in which the individuals 
responsible continue to injure and kill over the course of several days. The public 
statements made by officials in the heat of the crisis have the potential to influence the 
killers and reduce or increase the death toll. Therefore, it is important to use these events 
as an opportunity to look closely at the methods of communication and uncover lessons 
learned. 
Primary Research Question: What Can We Learn from the Deconstruction of 
Crisis Communication by Public Officials in Unfolding, High Consequence Events? 
Answers to the subset of questions that follow helped in examining the actions of 
officials in these cases. 
 What are the best practices offered from the research about risk and crisis 
communication? 
 Did officials use, or appear to use, these best practices in their delivery of 
public information? 
 What affect did the methods of crisis communication by public officials 
have in the outcomes of each case? 
 What elements of these events created the frenzy of media inquiries that 
thrust it onto a national stage as opposed to a routine local news story? 
 Did the agencies involved have specific policies and procedures for 
releasing public information during an unfolding crisis? Were they 
followed? 
 Did the agencies’ method of providing public information prove to be 
effective in adequately information the public? 
C. THEORETICAL SENSITIVITY 
An important caveat to understand better the way the researcher selected the case 
studies and analyzed the specific point-in-time events is to acknowledge the influence of 
professional knowledge, experience and on-going practice in the field of risk and crisis 
communication. This transparency provides context for the nuances of analysis that may 
not be apparent to the reader, and recognizes the inherent biases of the researcher that 
may have shaped the findings, which is called “theoretical sensitivity,” and is often 
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associated with grounded theory. “Theoretical sensitivity refers to the attribute of having 
insight, the ability to give meaning to data, the capacity to understand, and capability to 
separate the pertinent from that which isn’t. All this is done in conceptual rather than 
concrete terms.”19 This sensitivity comes from a number of sources, such as knowledge 
of the literature, as well as professional and person experience.  
Specific to this thesis, the researcher has over 20 years of experience working 
full-time in the field of risk and crisis communication, specifically in the public safety 
and law enforcement disciplines. He has been directly involved in crafting public 
messaging and delivering it to the public and media during some of the highest profile 
criminal cases of the past two decades, including the murder of three women in Yosemite 
National Park in 1999, the disappearance and murder of Washington intern Chandra Levy 
in 2001, and the murder trial of Scott Peterson, sentenced to death for the murder of his 
wife Laci and their unborn son. (A more detailed explanation of the significance of these 
past events is provided in the Conclusion and Reflection chapter of this thesis). In 
addition, the researcher has been a full-time public information officer and manager at 
two law enforcement agencies, as well as a part-time crisis communication instructor at 
the California Specialized Training Institute—the training arm of the Governor’s Office 
of Emergency Services. He has also served as the Commander of Media Relations for the 
California Highway Patrol and director of communication for both the Governor’s Office 
of Homeland Security and California Emergency Management Agency. At the time of 
this thesis, he was serving as a gubernatorial appointee leading the state’s crisis 
communication efforts in the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services. 
Detailing this professional experience is not intended to be a self-serving 
curriculum vitae of the researcher, but rather an explanation the basis of his theoretical 
sensitivity and the lens through which he viewed the events to collect data and create 
small theoretical frameworks about concepts and their relationships. For example, 
specific press conferences are selected and examined as a part of the case studies offered 
in this thesis. To the layman, a reading of the written transcript of what was said by 
                                                 
19 Barney G. Glaser, Theoretical Sensitivity: Advances in the Methodology of Grounded Theory, vol. 
2, (Mill Valley, CA: Sociology Press, 1978), 41. 
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officials might be deemed adequate for the analysis of the quality and effectiveness of 
risk and crisis communication performed. However, the researcher not only read the 
transcripts, but also carefully watched video recordings of the actual press coverage of 
the events and the methods of portrayal by the news media. The researcher knows from 
past experience, and the literature, that the totality of communication in this context 
includes nonverbal cues and behaviors, such as posture, facial expression, eye gaze, 
gestures, tone of voice, location, and attire. Research has demonstrated that appearance 
can alter physiological reactions, judgments, and interpretations. The recognition of these 
nonverbal cues and behaviors is critical to this research and sheds light on influences that 
may not be recognized by those involved in risk and crisis communication.20 
D. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
The following chapters use the problems and issue presented in Chapter I as a 
guide to expand upon the issues that influence the outcomes in high-profile cases.  
Chapter II provides a more in-depth look at the literature and research in the field 
of risk and crisis communication and the role of the news media. It exemplifies some of 
the lessons learned from major events and explores practices of large government 
agencies, such as the U.S. Centers for Disease Control. It also looks at the role of 
leadership in law enforcement and the principles recommended to address critical 
incidents. This chapter also examines some of the issues that are not clear and need 
further research. 
Chapter III describes the research design and methods used to conduct case 
studies on two similar high-profile law enforcement incidents that occurred in 2013—the 
Boston Marathon bombings and the Christopher Dorner manhunt. It also expands on why 
these cases were selected and the unique circumstances that provide a basis for analysis 
against best practices in the field of risk and crisis communication. It explains the method 
to employ descriptive and exploratory research paradigms to look for correlations and 
                                                 
20 James M. Carroll and James A. Russell, “Do Facial Expressions Signal Specific Emotions? Judging 
Emotion from the Face in Context,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 70, no. 2 (1996): 205. 
 12
consistent themes related to the methods of crisis communication used by public officials 
in these events, and examine the outcomes and relative effectiveness.  
Chapter IV focuses on the principles and best practices in the field of risk and 
crisis communication. This chapter explains the specific best practices selected for 
comparison in this thesis, and how they are focused on crisis communication principles 
and guidance used in a law enforcement context, as both case studies focused on law 
enforcement’s response to unfolding crimes. It also focuses on the importance of 
delivering timely messages, how effective news conferences are conducted, the 
importance of advanced planning and practice, and the elements of communication that 
build and maintain trust during a crisis. 
Chapter V is a case study focused on how the greater Los Angeles area faced an 
unprecedented nine-day manhunt in February 2013 for a particularly dangerous multiple-
murder suspect named Christopher Dorner. It explains how this ex-LAPD officer posed 
an unprecedented threat to law enforcement and the unique challenges that his rampage 
posed. This chapter also looks at the statements made by the LAPD and other agencies 
and the secondary effects of public perception, as well as highlights some of the 
coordination challenges experienced because of not utilizing existing mutual aid systems 
and communication breakdowns between agencies. 
Chapter VI is a case study focused on how fear and uncertainty gripped much of 
the greater Boston, Massachusetts area after two homemade bombs were detonated at the 
finish line of the Boston Marathon in April 2013. It focuses on the pre-event readiness 
and coordination conducted by a wide range of agencies and their effect on the outcomes. 
A few key press conferences are examined to determine if the statements of public 
officials were consistent with best practices in risk and crisis communication. It also 





Chapter VII uses the valuable real-world insight into the complexities and 
challenges of communicating during a high-profile crisis to provide recommendations for 
public officials and organizations likely to face similar events in the future. These 
recommendations are derived from the best practices identified in literature review; 
analysis of the events described herein; and this researcher’s 20 years of full-time career 
experience in risk and crisis communication during similar high-profile cases in the past. 
 14
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 15
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature reviewed for this thesis focused largely on research into the use of 
risk and crisis communication during high concern or high stress circumstances. Unlike 
the craft of marketing, communicating to affected populations during emergencies and 
disasters is not a sales pitch or political “spin.” Crises are unique circumstances that 
involve complex psychological effects that influence the ability to process and 
understand messages. The literature also recognized the importance of public officials 
developing and using a risk and crisis communication strategy when responding to 
alarming, confusing, rapidly changing, or high concern/consequence events. It also 
highlighted the importance of leadership in effectively building public trust as an event 
unfolds. Experts in the field of risk and crisis communication also stressed the need for 
leaders and spokespersons to receive specific training in risk and crisis communication 
and then practice those skills before a crisis emerges. This review also investigated the 
changing field of journalism and how contemporary newsgathering has changed 
significantly since the days before 24-hour cable television news and the influence of 
people’s access to the Internet.  
A. CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ABOUT RISK AND CRISIS 
COMMUNICATION 
According to the literature, a distinction exists between “risk communication” and 
“crisis communication.” The National Academy of Sciences defines risk communication 
as an interactive process of exchange of information and opinion among individuals, 
groups, and institutions. It involves multiple messages about the nature of risk and other 
messages, not strictly about risk, that express concerns, opinions, or reactions to risk 
messages or to legal and institutional arrangements for risk management. Risk 
communication is often employed for complex issues and easily misunderstood concerns, 
such as a parent’s decision to vaccinate a healthy baby against whooping cough or what 
the risks are to residents living near a nuclear power plant.  
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Crisis communication has a narrower focus that includes dynamic and unexpected 
events or threats, and requires immediate and effective actions to reduce harm. It 
generally describes the communication activities of an organization or agency facing a 
crisis, and the areas in which they need to communicate about that crisis to their 
organization, various partners, and the public.21 For example, public safety officials may 
need to evacuate a town threatened by an approaching wildfire. To accomplish this task, 
they would use best practices in crisis communication to explain the risk quickly and 
motivate the town’s residents to evacuate because the fire poses an immediate threat to 
life. In contrast, risk communication would be used to explain the relative risk of wildfire 
to residents when no immediate threat exists. The difference between risk and crisis 
communication is also described as what “might happen” versus what “is happening.”22  
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) created a specific 
category of risk and crisis communication combined together and called “crisis and 
emergency risk communication,” or CERC. They make the distinction that this method of 
communicating involves a narrow time constraint and involves specific subject-matter 
experts who provide information to the public—as opposed to just leaders in emergency 
management, such as police and fire chiefs.23  
Dr. Peter Sandman, an often-cited risk communication speaker and consultant, 
coined the equation “Risk = Hazard + Outrage.” One of his most notable works is a 166-
minute video, produced by the American Industrial Hygiene Association in 2004, that 
covers 25 crisis communication recommendations, and focuses chiefly on the most 
difficult messaging challenges that even experienced crisis communicators encounter. He 
argues that public officials often overuse the excuse that providing too much information, 
or unverified information, will cause a “panic” response from the public. Sandman asserts 
that, based on his research, panic rarely ever happens, and that effective communicators 
                                                 
21 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication Manual,” 
2012 ed. accessed February 14, 2014, http://emergency.cdc.gov/cerc/pdf/CERC_2012edition.pdf. 
22 Peter Sandman, “The Peter M. Sandman Risk Communication website,” 2014, 
www.psandman.com. 
23 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication Manual,” 
6. 
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should not think it is panic when it instead is disobedience, mistrust, worry, or excessive 
caution. This situation proves a powerful point because the same fear associated with 
irrational reactions by the public appears to be the basis for poor decision making by 
officials in a crisis. Misinterpreting the public’s reaction as panic causes a chain reaction 
of providing less information and fewer opportunities to communicate effectively during 
a crisis.24 
Less than 5 percent of public stress is driven by facts, according to Dr. Vincent 
Covello, a nationally and internationally recognized trainer, researcher, consultant, and 
expert in crisis, conflict, change and risk communications. His research shows that public 
concerns typically are based 95 percent on perceptions and only 5 percent on facts. 
People’s behavior usually is predicated on perceptions—often misperceptions—that 
differ substantially from reality (facts).25 This aspect is a critical distinction where 
Covello highlights the difference between what people need to hear when they are 
stressed and what public officials actually say, or do not say, when a crisis strikes. He has 
authored or edited over 25 books and over 75 published articles on risk assessment, 
management, and communication. 
The difference between communicating under normal circumstances and during a 
crisis is partially explained in the Commanders Guide to Effective Crisis Communication, 
written by Major Tyrone M. Woodyard of the U.S. Air Force. He concludes that a 
message can be shaped by the sender that can become distorted as it transmits through a 
medium or through interpretation of the receiver. During a crisis, the understanding of 
information provided by officials is affected by confusion, fear, stress, and pressure.26 He 
claims that with the proper communication from leadership, the organization can gain 
control of a crisis, which is an important distinction because it elevates the importance of 
communication commensurate with tactical and response strategies often given the most 
                                                 
24 Randall N. Hyer and Vincent T Covello, Effective Media Communication during Public Health 
Emergencies, World Health Organization, 2005, 11. 
25 Center for Risk Communication, “Determination of Trust.” 
26 Tyrone M. Woodward, Crisis Communication: A Commanders Guide to Effective Crisis 
Communication (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, April 1998). 
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weight by emergency managers. Often, the focus of tactics is centered on life-safety 
actions, such as firefighting, rendering medical aid, stopping criminal behavior, etc. 
Woodyard also cites a finding by Dr. Covell that effective crisis communication 
skills needed to be effective can be taught. As with most critical skills, however, proper 
training and practice must be received to maintain proficiency. Effective spokespersons 
must learn how to execute their skills and techniques under simulated and real crisis 
conditions. Woodyard ends his report by saying, “I have concluded the Air Force has a 
very solid and credible crisis communication program that teaches proven and effective 
crisis communication techniques.”27  
In a published report from the World Health Organization, a 2004 meeting of 
high-level decision makers collaborated on the topic of crisis communication and drew 
similar conclusions to those of Covello and Woodyard. “Unless the public is clear about 
what to do and why, the management of such a crisis can create confusion, anxiety and a 
breakdown of trust. Communication will directly influence how events evolve.”28 The 
report examines a variety of events concerning people’s risk of various health-related 
crises. Specifically, they examined five cases of events including dioxin, avian flu, severe 
acute respiratory syndrome, risk communication on measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) 
vaccination and health care errors. The authors observe that “risk communication” is part 
of crisis communication but focuses on the existence, nature, form, severity or 
acceptability of risks. One of the important variables in the ability to communicate is the 
public’s trust—i.e., “Can I trust what these people are saying?” The cases studies shared 
a common climate of mistrust and suspicion, blame, and sometimes retribution. 
Interestingly, the report concludes that a “very different” perception of risk often occurs 
between the public and health professionals, which may explain why health professionals 
tend to appear disaffected, or lacking empathy, in the midst of high anxiety event fueled 
by misinformation or public misunderstanding of the facts by the public. The key 
                                                 
27 Woodward, Crisis Communication: A Commanders Guide to Effective Crisis Communication, 35. 
28 World Health Organization, Sixth Futures Forum on Crisis Communication: Reykjavik, Iceland, 
10–11 May 2004, Copenhagen, Denmark, 1. 
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question is, once again, why are leaders in health issues (physicians) often ineffective in 
building trust during a crisis?29 
The importance of having well developed practiced risk and crisis 
communications plans and strategies in place before a crisis was a consistent theme 
throughout the literature. For example, the CDC examined their performance during 
major events, such as the 2001 Anthrax incident and the 2003 SARS outbreak. Although 
the CDC had operational plans in place for responding to health emergencies and 
stockpiles of the antibiotic Cipro (Anthrax is a bacterium that can be treated with 
antibiotics), media reports flooded the news channels in 2001 claiming a shortage existed. 
Despite their efforts to communicate effectively during the anthrax incident, national 
media criticized the CDC’s Anthrax operation for more than a year afterwards. In 2001, 
the CDC did not have a communications plan or adequate resources devoted to 
communications. As a result, they invested heavily in creating a communications plan.30 
Working from a well-developed communications plan is as important as other emergency 
response activities. The public’s perception of success or failure in an emergency is based 
partly on the actual success of response and recovery activities, but more so, on how well 
it was communicated. “As a leader, you need to know that the public judges the success 
of your operation, in great part, by the success of your communication,” claims Dr. 
Barbara Reynolds.31 
A comprehensive guide to best practices in crisis communication published by 
Booz Allen Hamilton, a U.S. government contractor, surveys a wide range of events in 
which best practices have resulted in both failure and successes in crisis and risk 
communication.32 It reiterates the widely held definitions of crisis and risk 
communication, identifies strategies to be an effective communicator, and enumerates 
                                                 
29 Bev J. Holmes, Natalie Henrich, Sara Hancock, and Valia Lestou, “Communicating with the Public 
During Health Crises: Experts’ Experiences and Opinions.” Journal of Risk Research 12, no. 6 (2009): 
793–807.  
30 Barbara S. Reynolds, Julia Hunter Galdo, and Lynn Sokler, Crisis and Emergency Risk 
Communication: By Leaders for Leaders, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2004. 
31 Ibid., 9. 
32 Booz Allen Hamilton, “Best Practices for Government Agencies and Non-Profit Organizations,” 
2010, http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/Risk-and-Crisis-Communications-Guide.pdf. 
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seven underemphasized areas (new technology, preparedness for dynamic risk incidents, 
culture, interconnectedness of agencies, organizational culture, and policies). “Experts 
agree that good communication cannot substitute for bad policies, ineffective decision 
making, or inadequate planning in other areas,” concludes the report.33 This fact is 
important because an appreciation for the “need” for training and practice in crisis 
communication is often present, but sometimes, organizations’ own policies restrict the 
ability to communicate even the most basic information in a timely manner. Decision 
makers within those same organizations who believe that the media is inherently bad or 
biased will complicate the process of effective communication because they are focused 
on variables that are out of their control—i.e., how the media does its job. 
In 2011, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services (the COPS Office) published a 124-page “toolkit” for law enforcement 
executives and communications executives to help them understand how the news media 
has changed over the past 20 years, how to develop a strategic communications plan 
focusing on the role of the chief and sheriff, and discusses the unique communication 
needs that crop up during times of crisis.34 The report emphasizes the important 
leadership role the chief of police plays in critical external events, such as large-scale 
riots, and natural or man-made disasters. “In times of crisis, people look to their leaders 
for guidance, answers, accountability, and hope. The police executive must be the lead 
spokesperson in the wake of a crisis.” The messages delivered by that executive must be 
evaluated in terms of two parts: content and position. Content is generally the facts, who, 
what, when, where, etc. Position is the official response by the agency or agencies 
relative to the events. The position is where statements and expressions of emotions, such 
as outrage and empathy, by leadership play a key role. If a leader does not provide both 
the facts and expresses empathy, the public’s emotions risk being further inflamed. The 
report also recommends that agencies provide information as quickly as possible so that 
the agency has the ability to have an offensive, proactive position rather than allowing 
others to fill the void with their own information.  
                                                 
33 Booz Allen Hamilton, “Best Practices for Government Agencies and Non-Profit Organizations,” 2. 
34 Stephens and Hill, Strategic Communication Practices: A Toolkit for Police Executives, 97. 
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B. WHAT ROLE DOES THE NEWS MEDIA PLAY? 
The news media are key contributors, and sometimes creators, in the construction 
of and communication about risk.35 Media coverage is a powerful factor in determining 
reaction to a perceived crisis. An almost insatiable appetite for information exists as a 
crisis emerges and the news media have been the best equipped to gather and disseminate 
what is known.36 Unfortunately, the increasingly high turnover of journalists and de-
emphasis on specialty reporting in most newsrooms has led to weaknesses in the 
interpretation and understanding of complex messages. News organizations have cut back 
on their newsroom staff by 30 percent since 2000.37 According to a survey of newspapers 
in 2004 asking about their preparedness to report on public health emergencies, “More 
than 80 percent of respondents said they view journalists as important first responders to 
public health emergencies. Yet only 7 of the 164 responding papers reported that their 
staff received training specifically for public health emergencies, and only 25 reported 
having formal plans for public health emergencies.”38 
1. Media’s Role in Spreading Negative Consequences 
Widespread media coverage of large-scale, community-based traumas, such as the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, or the Boston Marathon bombings, may also play 
a role in the mental health of people exposed to the coverage. A 2013 study on the 
media’s role in the Boston Marathon bombings examined whether collective media 
coverage may trigger psychological distress in individuals outside the directly affected 
community.39 Researchers conducted a nationwide survey to determine whether repeated 
                                                 
35 Jenny Kitzinger, “Researching Risk and the Media,” Health, Risk & Society 1, no. 1 (1999): 55–69. 
36 Wilson Lowrey, Karla Gower, William Evans, and Jenn Mackay. “Assessing Newspaper 
Preparedness for Public Health Emergencies,” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 83, no. 2 
(2006): 362–380. 
37 Lisa Silver, “Five Ways Journalism Is Changing,” Ijnet International Journalists’ Network, 2011, 
http://ijnet.org/stories/five-ways-journalism-changing. 
38 Lowrey, Gower, Evans, and Mackay, “Assessing Newspaper Preparedness for Public Health 
Emergencies,” 367. 
39 E. Alison Holman, Dana Rose Garfin, and Roxane Cohen Silver, “Media’s Role in Broadcasting 
Acute Stress Following the Boston Marathon Bombings,” Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences 111, no. 1 (2014): 93–98. 
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media exposure to the Boston Marathon bombings was associated with acute stress and 
compared the impact of direct exposure (being at or near the bombings) vs. media 
exposure (bombing-related television, radio, print, online, and social media coverage) on 
acute stress. Interestingly, it found that people outside of the Boston area exposed to 
repeated media coverage experienced more stress than those directly exposed to the 
bombings. The study suggests that the news media may become a conduit that spreads 
negative consequences of community trauma beyond directly affected communities. 
2. Influence of Social Media 
Today, the flow of information is faster and more diverse with the birth of social 
media. Now, the public has access to more than just the tried-and-true network newscasts, 
such as NBC, ABC, CBS, and mass-circulation newspapers like the New York Times and 
San Francisco Chronicle. Among today’s new, digital news consumers, 52 percent 
receive at least some news from Facebook and Twitter, according to a 2012 survey by the 
Pew Research Center. The study also revealed 92 percent go directly to news websites 
and 85 percent use search instead of waiting for the next edition of the newspaper or the 
by-appointment news. A companion study by Pew, they examined the “stickiness” of 
news websites versus social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter. Facebook 
users spent an average of 423 minutes each on the site in December. By contrast, a Pew 
analysis of Nielsen Net View data puts the average time on a top 25 news site at just 
under 12 minutes per month.40 
The results suggest that social media is not simply replacing traditional news 
sources, but providing another avenue through which consumers to obtain information, 
which, presents both opportunities and peril for risk and crisis communicators. The 
ability to disseminate messages to the public is easier than ever because officials are not 
relying so heavily on mass media sources, such as their local newspapers, radio, or 
television stations. A wide range of tools, such at Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, 
and blogs, are now easily accessed, user friendly, and free to use. 
                                                 
40 Amy Mitchell, Tom Rosenstiel, and Leah Christian, “What Facebook and Twitter Mean for News | 
State of the Media,” accessed January 11, 2013, Pew Research Center Blog, http://stateofthemedia.org/ 
2012/what-facebook-and-twitter-mean-for-news/. 
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For example, former California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger had 
approximately 2.7 million followers of his account as of January 2013 
(https://twitter.com/Schwarzenegger). He often circumvented the press release channels 
used by his press office and simply posted information on Twitter. In 2009, his private jet 
made an emergency landing at the Van Nuys Airport after the pilot reported smoke in the 
cockpit. He “tweeted” the incident and a photo of his plane to his followers, which was 
immediately picked up by mainstream media.41 His staff first discovered the governor’s 
in-fight emergency when mass media sources saw the Tweet and began calling the press 
office. 
Some perils do exist in using social media to communicate with the public. Unless 
the organization is transparent and specific about how it intends to use these services, the 
general public may have unrealistic expectations of the agency. For example, in a survey 
by the American Red Cross in August 2012, three out of four Americans (76 percent) 
expect help in less than three hours of posting a request on social media, up from 68 
percent in 2011.42 Studies have also found that outdated, inaccurate, or false information 
has been disseminated via social media forums during disasters.43 
C. WHAT WE DO NOT KNOW 
Many guides to effective crisis and risk communication are in existence. They 
often provide bullet point lists of recommendations of what to do and what not to do 
when communicating with the public in a crisis. A simple Google search for “crisis 
communication tools” returns dozens of useful and valuable tools, including scholarly 
publications and links to presentations conducted for government organizations.  
What appears to be missing in the literature is the connection between the 
plethora of “how to” materials available and their actual use and efficacy. Often, more 
                                                 
41 Amanda O’Donnell, “Schwarzenegger Tweets About Jet’s Emergency Landing,” CNN.com, June 
20, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/06/20/california.emergency.landing/index.html. 
42 American Red Cross, “More Americans Using Mobile Apps in Emergencies,” August 31, 2012, 
http://www.redcross.org/news/press-release/More-Americans-Using-Mobile-Apps-in-Emergencies. 
43 Bruce R. Lindsay, “Social Media and Disasters: Current Uses, Future Options and Policy 
Considerations,” Journal of Current Issues in Media & Telecommunications 2, no. 4 (2010): 6. 
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examples of bad public communication than good are seen, which leads to the belief that 
public officials involved in a crisis are either unaware of the best practices or do not 
employ them when they are needed the most. With the exception of the best practices 
highlighted by Booz Allen Hamilton, virtually no guidance about how to deal with 
sensitive internal issues that affect the outcome of communicating in a crisis is available, 
such as how to deal with an overbearing elected official who grandstands during a crisis, 
when (if ever) its appropriate to violate rules and regulations for the greater public good, 
and whether or not those who actually appear in the public eye are the ones receiving the 
training and practicing before disaster strikes. Often public information officers are 
relegated to background roles during a major crisis, and ironically, they are more likely to 
have the proper training and experience to deliver the most effective message. A gap 
appears to exist between knowledge and performance. 
Government officials and communication experts also possess divergent opinions 
about how to incorporate new technologies, such as social media and mobile phones into 
risk and crisis communications plans.44 Some government agencies still restrict access to 
social media platforms (i.e., Facebook, Twitter) because of ethical or legal concerns, 
records management challenges, impacts to employee productivity, and the agency’s 
ability to devote adequate resources to maintain, monitor, and administer social media 
tools.45 Fears and uncertainty about the implications of using social media may dissuade 
their use until agency leaders have a better understanding of their practicality. The rapidly 
changing functioning of these technologies also underpins a level of uncertainty about 
how reliable they will be in the long run. However, a growing number of real-world 
examples of effective use of social media are available, such as what is described in the 
Boston Marathon Bombing case study in this paper.  
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When looking at the available research, risk and crisis communication plays an 
important role in the public’s understanding of complex issues and emergencies. It is 
distinguished by its specific use when a high concern issue creates confusion, fear, 
anxiety and misunderstanding. It is also misunderstood. Many of the thought leaders in 
this discipline point out that risk and crisis communication is distinctly different from 
“public relations.” The circumstances surrounding a crisis often cause the public to focus 
disproportionately on negative information, which is a central principle of modern 
psychology that people put greater value on losses (negative outcomes) than on gains 
(positive outcomes)—often called negativity bias or “negative dominance theory.”46 A 
greater emotional force is given to negative information, which affects perception, 
attention, judgment, and decision making. The disproportionally negative emotions of 
those experiencing a crisis, left without mitigating response by public officials, may lead 
to negative behaviors that hamper recovery or cause more harm. Therefore, when leaders 
are seen as ineffective communicators, and are unable to gain public trust and 
cooperation, those most impacted by a crisis ignore them. Worse, their incompetence can 
itself become a lead news story and distract from the disaster at hand. 
                                                 
46 Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1970). 
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD 
This thesis focuses on public information and crisis communication methods used 
by public officials during two similar unfolding, high-profile crimes that occurred within 
the United States in 2013. It attempts to determine if officials followed their agency’s 
own public information policies, and if those were consistent with risk and crisis 
communications best practices. The paper determines if the statements made by public 
officials affected the outcome of the event (helped or hindered) and if the agencies took 
any actions internally to change, amend or maintain their policies because of their crisis 
communication experience in these events. 
Two specific incidents are the foundation for comparison, contrast and analysis. 
 Murder spree by former LAPD officer Christopher Dorner and ensuing 
manhunt on February 3–12, 2013, in the greater Southern California area 
 Boston Marathon bombings on April 15, 2013, and ensuing manhunt that 
led up to the capture of two suspects on April 19, 2013, in and around the 
Boston, Massachusetts area 
These two events were chosen because they are contemporary law enforcement 
cases happening in the United States, within months of each other, during which fugitives 
were on the run for several days, which created building uncertainty and anxiety within 
the public. In addition, as known from the literature, the public’s decision making is 
influenced by emotions that limit their ability to accept and process information. The 
public’s safety was, in part, a factor in their trust in public officials and the effectiveness 
of messages that could keep people out of harm’s way. They both attracted extensive 
media coverage beyond the routine local news audience market and become stories 
covered extensively nationally and internationally.  
A. WIDESPREAD EFFECT 
These cases are in those ways highly representative of events that gain an 
extraordinary amount of public interest and attention, and affect even those not directly 
impacted by the event. With the uncertainty of all the suspects’ location(s) or plans, it 
could be argued that widespread jeopardy was experienced throughout the United States, 
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which differs from a criminal targeting (or has targeted) a specific individual, or has a 
singular focus of his anger (e.g., abortion doctors, executives in a workplace, community 
leaders, family members). In both these cases, the suspects seemed to be using violence 
both specifically and indiscriminately to make a statement. 
B. COMPLEXITY AND UNFOLDING DYNAMIC 
Since these events were dynamic and involved a high degree of risk (e.g., armed 
and dangerous fugitives likely to commit additional violence crimes), a need, and 
demand, for timely life-safety information releases by officials was required. Unlike 
events that begin and end in a relatively short amount of time during which the most 
damage and injury occur all at once (e.g., train derailment, earthquakes, tornadoes), these 
events were not “natural” and unfolded over the course of several days. The outcome 
could have been impacted, negatively or positively, by risk and crisis communication by 
public officials. Citizens were not only potentially in harm’s way, but became part of the 
process of identifying and locating suspects before they were apprehended. In fact, 
officials relied on the public as heavily as on their internal investigative leads and skills. 
In both cases, the public provided the final tips to end the crises. These two events were 
also characterized by their complexity and the magnitude of response by multiple law 
enforcement agencies in relatively large metropolitan areas—Boston and Los Angeles. 
C. SOURCES AND RESEARCH PARADIGMS 
This thesis used comparative case study as the research method. The sources of 
data for analysis included news coverage footage, videotaped press conferences available 
online, and publicly available interviews with key leaders involved in the actual events, 
as well as any after action reports, publicly accessible agency investigative records and 
written procedures for public affairs and crisis management for the cities, counties and 
federal agencies identified as primarily responsible for the investigation and manhunt. 
The goal was to employ descriptive and exploratory research paradigms to look 
for correlations and consistent themes related to the methods of crisis communication 
used by public officials in these events, and examine the outcomes and relative 
effectiveness.  
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The intent was to identify what practices and outcomes, if any, correlate between 
these high-profile events and identify whether they were consistent with standard 
practices recommended by experts and successful practitioners in risk and crisis 
communication. Gaining a deeper insight beyond the traditional “after action report” 
method of evaluating the effectiveness of risk and crisis communication in critical events 
may shed new light on the adequacy of existing policies and provide valuable guidance to 
public officials facing similar challenges in the public eye. It may also provide real world 
validation for best practices identified in the research.  
These two events are complex and multifaceted. A wide range of case studies 
could be conducted on these events focusing on areas, such as the unique demands of the 
criminal investigation, psychological profile of the offender(s), method of widespread 
operational deployment of personnel and resources, prevention and mitigation strategies 
for future similar events, etc.  
However, this paper focused on the issue of risk and crisis communication by 
public officials in these two high consequence events. An in-depth look at the study of 
risk and crisis communication was examined to develop the baseline of known best 
practices. Then, research was conducted to determine who made public statements or 
provided public information and their intent of that action. An analysis was conducted to 
deconstruct the research materials to determine what, if anything, could be learned from 
these events.  
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IV. PRINCIPLES AND BEST PRACTICES 
In the field of risk and crisis communication, a significant amount of scientific 
literature, case studies and guidance analyzed and consolidated into “best practices” is 
available. For the purposes of this research, “best practices” are a set of principles and 
guidance about the process and content of communication.47 They include a high degree 
of consensus among practitioners and scholars combined with new evidence and 
emerging lessons learned from real-world events, such as the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, the anthrax episode of 2001, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the 
transportation system bombings in London and Madrid (2004 and 2005), the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill in 2010 and others.  
The case studies examined in this paper were dynamic and unexpected events that 
required immediate and effective actions to reduce harm. The best practices selected for 
comparison in this paper are primarily focused on crisis communication principles and 
guidance used in a law enforcement context, as both case studies focused on law 
enforcement’s response to unfolding crimes. Many of the best practices chosen for 
comparison in this paper are relevant to both risk and crisis communication, but some are 
especially critical during events in which public officials may have the opportunity use 
them to affect the outcome by mitigating additional harm and assisting in the 
apprehension of those responsible.  
Although an extensive number of best practices are identified in various fields of 
emergency public safety communication, this paper focuses on six main principles that 
form the foundation for relevant best practices in crisis communication during unfolding 
and ongoing incidents similar to those examined in this paper. These seven principles are 
drawn from three primary sources: Booz Allen Hamilton’s review of best practices in risk 
and crisis communication, CDC’s review of best practices in crisis and emergency risk 
communication, and the World Health Organization’s review of media best practices in 
crises and emergencies:  
                                                 
47 Booz Allen Hamilton, “Risk and Crisis Communications,” 1. 
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A. BUILDING AND MAINTAINING TRUST 
High levels of trust can reduce social uncertainty and complexity, and influence 
risk perceptions and acceptance of risks. The public typically judges the trustworthiness 
of a message based on its content and source. “Who is telling me this?” and “Can I trust 
them?” If the public concludes that they cannot trust the source of the information, then 
the efforts by public officials to communicate effectively is likely to fail. Although trust 
is generally a long-term, cumulative process, it is easily lost and difficult to regain.48 
The most important factors involved in trust include perceived 
 Listening, caring, empathy and compassion 
 Honesty, openness, candidness, transparency and accountability 
 Expertise and competence 
 Perseverance, dedication, commitment and responsiveness 
Best practices identified in the literature to build and maintain trust include the following. 
 Expressions of empathy and caring should be expressed within the first 30 
seconds of a message  
 Statement of the facts (what, when, where, why, who, etc.) and 
acknowledgement of what is not known and explain why 
 Deploying spokespersons with authority and subject matter expertise 
 Expressions of dedication and commitment (i.e., “We have deployed all 
the resources available”) 
B. DELIVERY OF TIMELY MESSAGES AND INFORMATION 
The timeliness of the organization’s initial public messages during a crisis is 
widely acknowledged as a critical best practice. In today’s environment of rapid 
information sharing, those first to deliver information can frame the story of an incident 
through the Internet, social media, and mobile communication platforms. A crisis 
communication toolkit for police executives published by the DOJ in September 2011 
emphasizes, “Whenever possible, speak first. It is the offensive, proactive position, which 
is almost always preferable to the defensive and reactive position. Framing the issue is 
                                                 
48 Hyer and Covello, Effective Media Communication during Public Health Emergencies, 115. 
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the advantage that goes to the party that speaks first.”49 Since identifying their 
communication failures after the 2001 Anthrax attacks, the CDC made the speed of their 
communication a top priority. Their risk and crisis communication motto became “be 
first. be right. be credible.” This situation acknowledged how the speed with which 
organizations respond to the public can be an indicator of how prepared they are to 
respond to the emergency, that a system is in place, and that needed action is being 
taken.50 In general, the response to the public should be within the first hours of the 
incident and uninhibited by not knowing all the facts. Acknowledgment of uncertainty is 
acceptable and recommended to avoid expressions of overconfidence.51 
Initial messages to the public should be as follows. 
 Focused messages developed with a limited number of key messages: 
ideally three key messages or one key message with three parts for each 
underlying concern or specific question. 
 Short messages keep individual messages brief: ideally less than three 
seconds or less than nine words for each key message and less than nine 
seconds (for television and radio) and 27 (for the print media) words for 
the entire set of three messages. 
 Relevant information at the time of the message. Avoids a lot of 
background information or establishing the speaker or the organization. 
 Clear messages unmistakably understandable by the target audience: 
typically at the 6th to 8th grade readability level of communications to the 
general public 
 Repeated messages ensure consistency and durability of the message. 
C. CONDUCTING EFFECTIVE NEWS CONFERENCES 
Various information events can be developed to provide timely information 
during a crisis, and include town hall meetings, media availability sessions, and news 
conferences (sometimes referred to as press conferences). The most frequently used 
information event during a high-profile incident is the news conference. It provides an 
                                                 
49 Stephens and Hill, Strategic Communication Practices: A Toolkit for Police Executives, 91. 
50 Barbara Reynolds, Julia Hunter Galdo, and Lynn Sokler, Crisis and Emergency Risk 
Communication (Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2002). 
51 Ibid., 37. 
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opportunity for journalists to receive information at one time and in one location. In high-
profile incidents, the conference is often carried live on television or streamed online so 
anyone watching has the opportunity to hear directly from the agency, or agencies, 
responsible for responding to the crisis.  
Best practices conducting effective news conferences include the following. 
 Location—Find a well-known location convenient for journalists, 
preferably near the actual incident scene so reporters are more likely to 
attend 
 Timing—In fast-breaking emergencies, consider holding at least two 
news conferences per day 
 Notification—Contact the media about the news conference using a 
media advisory in advance that includes the date, location, start and finish 
times, and a brief description of what information will be provided 
 Preparation—Ensure the room is the right size to accommodate the 
anticipated number of attendees, designate a moderator in advance of the 
news conference to keep the conference on schedule, establish ground 
rules and field reporters’ questions, and ensure main spokespersons 
rehearsed the key messages developed for the crisis and are ready to 
answer questions 
 Conduct—News conferences during a crisis are intended to provide only 
the latest information and allow journalists to ask questions 
 Make a formal opening statement brief—around 5 minutes 
 Mention all pertinent information (for example, who, what, where, 
when, why and how) in the opening statement 
 Allow time for questions (typically at least 10–15 minutes) 
 As a general rule, limit the number of speakers to no more than 
three and limit them to no more than five minutes each 
D. GUIDING AND ENCOURAGING APPROPRIATE ATTITUDES, 
DECISIONS, ACTIONS AND BEHAVIORS 
During a crisis, feelings of fear, anxiety, confusion and dread can build in the 
general public, which causes them to feel hopeless or helpless that can lead to irrational 
conclusions or unnecessary actions. A generally accepted way to reduce anxiety and 
restore a sense of control is to give them things to do. The actions suggested can be 
symbolic (e.g., put up the flag), preparatory (e.g., donate blood or create a family check-
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in plan), or reactive (e.g., stay vigilant; report suspicious activity; take protective 
measures such as evacuations).  
Best practices for guiding and encouraging appropriate attitudes, decisions, 
actions and behaviors include the following. 
 Specific actions the public can take 
 Who should take those actions 
 When those actions should or should not be taken 
E. COORDINATE, COLLABORATE AND ACT IN PARTNERSHIP WITH 
OTHER CREDIBLE SOURCES 
In a crisis, local, state, regional and national response officials must work together 
to ensure messages are consistent. When faced with a new threat, people want a 
consistent and simple recommendation to follow. They want to hear agreement about 
what they should do from multiple experts through multiple sources. Messages do not 
have to be wrong to be damaging. If they are inconsistent, the public will lose trust in the 
response officials and begin to question every recommendation. Local, state, regional, 
and national response officials and their partners must work together to ensure messages 
are consistent, especially when the information is new to the public. 
F. ADVANCED PLANNING AND PRACTICE 
An overwhelming majority of the literature about risk and crisis communication 
reviewed, along with the experience of this researcher, supports the importance of pre-
event planning that includes the development of a communications plan and strategy. “A 
well-prepared leader will have communication plans and resources in place to help minimize 
the number of decisions about communication that must be made in the moment,” claims Dr. 
Barbara Reynolds, creator of the CDC’s crisis emergency risk communication model. This 
planning is important because a written plan allows for a quick and effective response 
because a majority of the decisions about how to respond to a crisis have already been 
decided. It can enable leaders and spokespersons to focus on the quality, accuracy, and 
speed of the agency’s crisis communications response. 
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Components of an effective communications plan include the identification of the 
following. 
 Procedures for gathering information on what has happened so far, what is 
currently happening, and what is expected to happen 
 Identification of who delivers the information, how and when the 
information is communicated 
 Preferred channels of communication—for example, through news 
releases, news conferences, the Internet, a toll-free telephone line, 
brochures, radio announcements, special events, door-to-door canvassing, 
or media interviews 
 Communication tasks to be accomplished, and who is responsible 
 Goals of messaging—for example, in informing, persuading or motivating 
Having a plan is important, but its effectiveness is dependent on practicing the 
plan using training and exercises designed to simulate real-world events and learn from 
them. Generally, the literature recommends conducting tabletop exercises, drills, or 
simulations to train employees and others on the plan. These exercises can also expose 
weaknesses that can be fixed while there is still time. An important key is to include the 
involvement of other agencies and departments likely to become interwoven into the 
response. Establishing connections before disaster strikes is critical because it allows for 
discussions about how to mitigate differences in understanding between agencies into the 
communications response.  
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V. CHRISTOPHER DORNER MANHUNT 
The greater Los Angeles area faced an unprecedented nine-day manhunt in 
February 2013 for a particularly dangerous multiple-murder suspect named Christopher 
Dorner. A highly armed former LAPD officer who began his rampage by allegedly 
murdering a couple in the city of Irvine on February 3, Dorner explicitly vowed to 
continue targeting and killing members of the greater law enforcement community to 
avenge his perceived defamation and discrimination by members of that agency. “I have 
exhausted all available means at obtaining my name back,” wrote Dorner in an extensive 
11,000-word manifesto published on his Facebook page on the night of his first alleged 
killings. “I will bring unconventional and asymmetrical warfare to those in LAPD 
uniform whether on or off duty. ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] is 
my strength and your weakness. You will now live the life of the prey.”52 
These chilling threats combined with his fatalistic determination prompted law 
enforcement officials to launch one of the biggest and most complex multi-agency 
responses in southern California history. His words, fueled by social media and 
traditional media outlets, spread intense fear not only among the public, but also 
unusually deep within the law enforcement community. By the time of his eventual 
capture and death during a standoff with police on February 12, Dorner is alleged to have 
killed four people, including three police officers, injured at least six others and caused 
millions of tax dollars to be spent on trying to capture this extremely dangerous and 
elusive fugitive. 
A. UNPRECEDENTED THREAT 
Law enforcement agencies are routinely involved in some sort of fugitive 
manhunt as part of their public safety mission. Whether it is attempting to locate one of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) “Ten Most Wanted Fugitives,” or searching 
for individuals alleged to have committed one of many various crimes that regularly 
                                                 
52 Christopher Dorner Manhunt, “Manhunt Manifesto,” Los Angeles Times, accessed January 13, 
2014, http://documents.latimes.com/christopher-dorner-manifesto/. 
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occur throughout cities and counties, these are a matter of routine daily law enforcement 
business. However, what distinguishes the Dorner manhunt from others is evidenced by 
these characteristics: 1) the suspect was a former law enforcement officer with military 
training, 2) demonstrated deadly actions with explicit intent to continue killing to gain 
public attention and retribution, 3) insider knowledge of police tactics intended to elude 
capture, and 4) specific tactical focus on named members of the LAPD, their families, 
and anyone who attempted to intercede. 
“The discovery of Dorner’s letter posted online—coupled with the homicides of 
Monica Quan and Officer Keith Lawrence—created a dynamic rarely confronted by law 
enforcement,” reads a nonpartisan review of law enforcements response by the 
Washington-based police foundation.53 “Threats had not only been made against officers, 
but these threats had actually been carried out against the family members of a former 
LAPD captain.”  
LAPD, as well as several other law enforcement agencies, went on “tactical 
alert,” which signaled one of the highest levels of mobilization. Officers were put on 
extended hours and off-duty officers were called back to work.54 Law enforcement 
officers were posted guard in front of LAPD headquarters and other locations believed to 
be targets of Dorner. Officers in tactical uniforms carrying assault rifles were noticeable 
in many areas of the city. This heightened security was reinforced with images and 
videos of heavily armed officers repeatedly broadcast by media outlets. 
Additionally, the manhunt and concurrent investigations expanded in both size 
and scope during the course of the event, which added to the difficulty of the law 
enforcement challenge. Multiple agencies spanning across five different southern 
California counties (Los Angeles, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego and Orange), 
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54 L.A. NOW, “LAPD Declares Citywide Tactical Alert,” Los Angeles Times, February 2, 2013, 
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covering an estimated population of more than 20 million people, had some role to play 
in this high consequence event.55  
At the center, the LAPD was the target of Dorner’s threats, and the following key 
agencies were conducting separate criminal investigations believed to be associated with 
Dorner’s actions: Irvine Police Department, Riverside Police Department, Torrance 
Police Department, and the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Office but does not account 
for the hundreds of other local, state and federal authorities that participated in various 
aspects of the response. Many were never directed to respond but self-deployed, which 
created significant problems with command and control.56  
B. COORDINATION 
The State of California is well known for its advanced emergency management 
systems and agreements. It uses the Standardized Emergency Management System 
(SEMS), which is the fundamental structure for the response phase of emergency 
management.57 The California Emergency Services Act (ESA) requires the use of this 
system for managing multiagency and multijurisdictional responses to emergencies in 
California. It is intended to unify all elements of California’s emergency management 
community into a single integrated system and standardizes key elements. SEMS 
incorporates the use of the incident command system (ICS), California disaster and civil 
defense master mutual aid agreement (MMAA), the operational area (OA) concept, and 
multiagency or inter-agency coordination. State agencies are required to use SEMS and 
local government entities must use SEMS to be eligible for any reimbursement of 
response-related costs under the state’s disaster assistance programs. 
As Dorner’s crimes expanded, and authorities located his burned truck in San 
Bernardino County, agencies involved in the manhunt realized their coordination efforts 
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56 “Police Under Attack. Southern California Law Enforcement Response to the Attacks by 
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57 California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, “Standardized Emergency Management 
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were not adequate to account for the wide geographic range of activities. Leaders formed 
a multi-agency coordination center (MACC) located at the Joint Regional Intelligence 
Center (JRIC) in the city of Norwalk. Mixed reviews of its effectiveness were received. 
The Foundation report concluded, “…some MACC systems worked well and others did 
not.” 58 Specifically, significant confusion occurred about the role of the MACC in both 
the manhunt and associated criminal investigations. Some agencies dispatched line-level 
officers and others sent command staff, which created an imbalance in decision-making 
authority and ability. Those familiar with the investigation said that much of the 
information compiled by the MACC was inaccurate.  
As the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department (SBCSD) continued 
searching for Dorner in the Big Bear Lake area, some executives in the MACC 
determined that priorities needed to be set. As a result, they established several objectives 
for the MACC including a “media strategy.” Differing accounts were received of what 
efforts were made to coordinate media messaging through a Joint Information Center 
(JIC), and it is unclear how extensive and/or effective that process was in the end.59 A 
deliberately coordinated talking points or a clear strategy on how to harness the media on 
an on-going basis does not appear to have been created.  
The SBCSD had two full-time PIOs on staff that became overwhelmed by media 
inquiries once Dorner’s truck was discovered in their jurisdiction on February 7, 2013.60 
They worked long hours and were unable to keep up with the demand for information by 
hundreds of reporters from around the world. Although they were aware of some 
statements made by neighboring jurisdictions, notably incorrect ones, they did not benefit 
from a coordinated joint information system (JIJS) or center that was apparently a 
function of the MACC. The Riverside Police Department was also aware of the existence 
of a JIC at the MACC and sent non-PIO law enforcement representatives to participate in 
it. In hindsight, Riverside police officials, witnessing the fatigue of their public 
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information colleagues in San Bernardino County, wished they had reached out to 
provide mutual aid assistance.61  
As for the multi-agency manhunt, the state’s robust law enforcement mutual aid 
system was not harnessed as a clearinghouse for the long-term deployment of resources 
across the region. Interviews with leaders of the agencies involved generally understood 
the existing structures, such as National Incident Management System (NIMS) and 
SEMS, but commitment was lacking to using them for the overall coordination. “Agency 
heads must fully commit to coordinated efforts and the use of NIMS and the three key 
constructs: Incident Command System, Multi-Agency Coordination System, and Public 
Information. The lack of full commitment in each of these three areas lead to problems 
between agencies.”62 
C. CONSEQUENCES: “WHEN THE TRUTH COMES OUT, THE KILLING 
STOPS” 
As with many high-profile investigations, law enforcement officials usually make 
careful public statements in an effort to satisfy the media’s curiosity or announce results, 
such as the arrest of a suspect. Often statements are made after a crime has occurred or 
where the suspect has been running from authorities to escape capture. In the Dorner 
case, although he was attempting to elude capture, he was antagonistically targeting the 
same law enforcement officers frantically trying to capture him. In essence, he was 
running toward them and posed a prolonged immediate threat to them and the general 
public.  
Authorities are often focused on crafting statements consistent with state law, and 
in the case of pending litigation, do not jeopardize the successful prosecution of the 
accused. In other cases, they may be aiming to improve their agency’s public image by 
demonstrating their success and competence through press releases. Specifically, the 
LAPD had detailed policies on what can and cannot be released, where the media can and 
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cannot be, and how the agency will handle requests for public information.63 Their media 
relations guide does not appear to provide specific strategies for complex, multi-agency 
investigations of the magnitude of this event. 
The consequences of law enforcement’s public statements were exceptionally 
high in this case, as evidenced by statements made in Dorner’s Facebook post. “[LAPD] 
Chief Beck, this is when you need to have that come to Jesus talk with Sgt. Teresa Evans 
and everyone else who was involved in the conspiracy to have me terminated for doing 
the right thing,”64 read the online manifesto. “I’ll be waiting for a PUBLIC response at a 
press conference. When the truth comes out, the killing stops.”  
Thus, Dorner was not what many in law enforcement would consider a typical 
criminal on the run. He was an exceptionally dangerous and active killer demanding a 
public dialog with LAPD officials through press conferences. He exhibited similar 
patterns of terrorist behaviors—engaging in careful preparation, lived near his targets, 
conducted surveillance, and engaged in criminal activity.65  
D. THE FIRST OFFICIAL STATEMENTS 
The first substantial public statement by officials announcing Dorner as a suspect 
occurred late in the evening of February 6, 2013, when the Irvine Police Department 
called a press conference and officially declared Dorner a suspect. At around the same 
time the LAPD issued its own press release.66 This release, or “statement,” is attributed to 
“the Department” rather than any individual public official of the LAPD and followed a 
standard, just-the-facts type of news release. It described Dorner as being wanted in 
connection with the double murder that occurred on “February 4, 2013” (which is an 
incorrect date) in the City of Irvine and acknowledged the general threats made by 
                                                 
63 Los Angeles Police Department, “LAPD Media Relations Guide 2008,” accessed February 11, 
2014, http://www.lapdonline.org/inside_the_lapd/content_basic_view/2023. 
64 Christopher Dorner Manhunt, “Manhunt Manifesto.” 
65 Brent Smith, “A Look at Terrorist Behavior: How They Prepare, Where They Strike,” NIJ Journal 
260 (2008): 3. 
66 Los Angeles Police Department, “LAPD Statement on Former Officer Wanted in Double Homicide 
NR12037,” February 6, 2013, http://www.lapdonline.org/newsroom/news_view/52948. 
 43
Dorner, but did not disclose that they originated from his manifesto posted on his 
Facebook page.67  
“The Department has learned that Christopher Dorner has made threats against 
members of the LAPD and we are taking those threats very seriously as we do all threats 
against our personnel and the public,” reads the release. It was written in third person and 
does not include any quotes from representatives or leaders, such as the police chief, in 
the release. This point is significant because no expression of concern or empathy was 
seen for those who were the target of his threats. 
The Irvine Police Department also issued a written press release, although it was 
shorter (95 words in length), and it announced that Dorner was a suspect in their double 
homicide investigation.68 It did not reference the extensive online manifesto or expand 
upon any of the specific threats made. It, too, did not include any quotes of public 
officials.  
It is important to note that media coverage of the Irvine homicides was localized 
and slow to develop. Officials did not connect Dorner to the murders until a law 
enforcement intelligence officer uncovered Dorner’s Facebook manifesto around 1:30 pm 
on February 6.69 Since the Facebook posting was seen as a primary piece of evidence, 
investigators attempted to keep it secret by having it removed from social media. 
Although officials were successful in convincing Facebook to remove it from that 
platform within hours of its discovery, it was too late; members of the media had already 
found it and downloaded it. This manifesto became an uncontrolled catalyst that 
propelled the story onto the national news stage, spread fear in southern California, and 
focused urgent attention on law enforcement action. 
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As a result, LAPD Chief Charlie Beck held a detailed press conference at the 
agency’s headquarters the next morning, Thursday, February 7.70 He was flanked by two 
other uniformed officers from his agency and spoke from a podium to a room full of 
reporters. He appeared serious and somewhat frustrated as he spent the first several 
minutes reading from prepared notes highlighting facts about the search for Dorner, the 
incidents that happened in other cities including the double murder in the City of Irvine, 
an attempted robbery in San Diego, the murder of a Riverside Police Officer earlier that 
morning in Riverside, and an officer involved shooting in the City of Torrance that 
injured two citizens and turned out to be a “case of mistaken identity by the officers.” He 
also provided specific information about how people can provide tips and information, 
including phone numbers to Crime Stoppers and the robbery homicide division. Beck 
briefly acknowledged the existence of Dorner’s “manifesto” and the fact that Dorner was 
a former Los Angeles police officer. However, Beck later rebuffed reporters’ specific 
questions by refusing to engage in a dialog about Dorner’s “ramblings on the Internet” 
and indirectly referred to Dorner as a coward.  
 
Figure 1.  LAPD Press Conference (Fox News)71  
                                                 




At the very end of Beck’s prepared remarks, after more than six minutes into his 
press conference, he appeared slightly emotional while expressing specific empathy for 
the victims. “The city mourns the deaths of Monica Quan, Keith Lawrence and our brave 
Riverside police officer. I also feel great sadness for the injuries suffered by my officer, 
the second Riverside officer, and the two uninvolved citizens in Torrance. With that, I 
will answer a very few questions…” Most of the ensuing questions were to clarify facts. 
However, at one point, he described the evolving situation as “…extremely worrisome 
and scary, especially to the police officers involved…” 
The Police Chief’s statements can be characterized as the following. 
 Appearing serious, sullen and official (in uniform) 
 Deliberate, scripted and/or prepared remarks 
 Providing extensive detailed facts (e.g., Dorner’s physical description, 
getaway vehicle, dates, times and locations of other crimes, agency actions 
and priorities, tipster phone numbers) 
 Empathetic towards specific victims 
 Dismissive of the main suspect’s alleged motivations 
 Validating fear the LAPD was experiencing 
This press conference was not the only public statement made by officials during 
the manhunt, but it was the one of the most significant and consequential. Chief Beck and 
members of the LAPD were specifically named by Dorner, which made them his primary 
target. Moreover, not only were public officials playing catch up to news outlets in an 
attempt to dispel inaccurate information and control the message, but also it was entirely 
possible that Dorner could have been watching to plot his next actions. The consequences 
of the statements made by LAPD’s top official were high and could have meant the 
difference between life and death. 
E. $1 MILLION REWARD ANNOUNCED BY THE MAYOR 
On Sunday, February 10, 2013, while Dorner was still on the loose, another major 
press conference was held at the LAPD. This time, more than just LAPD representatives 
were present. In an apparent effort to show unity, mayors and police chiefs from some 
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affected communities joined Beck and Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa in 
announcing a $1 million reward.72 Although Chief Beck spoke at this press conference, 
Mayor Villaraigosa was the highest-ranking official, and began by setting the tone for a 
reward announcement designed to expedite the capture of Dorner.  
Villaraigosa dressed in a suit and tie, was flanked by at least 12 officials (some in 
uniform and others in suits), and spoke from prepared notes at a podium. His opening 
statement was delivered in a serious and determined tone, and his statements were 
succinct and, in part, directed at Dorner: 
Let me be clear. Our dedication to catching this killer remains steadfast. 
Our confidence that we will bring him to justice is unshaken. This search 
is not a matter of ‘if,’ it’s a matter of ‘when.’ And I want Christopher 
Dorner to know that. To that end, we’re all here for one purpose to stand 
united and say that we will not tolerate a killer targeting our officers and 
their families. Targeting innocent people in this city and in this region… 
collectively, this group lead by my office, is posting a reward of one 
million dollars for information that will lead to Mr. Dorner’s capture.73  
 
Figure 2.  LAPD Press Conference (AP)74 
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The Mayor’s statements can be characterized as the following. 
 Appearing determined, focused and “in charge” 
 Displaying collaboration and unity 
 Deliberate, scripted and/or prepared remarks 
 Challenging of Dorner 
 Optimistic about bringing Dorner to justice 
The performance by the mayor and the deliberate display of unity among 
jurisdictions provided a significant show of coordination and effort on behalf of more 
than just law enforcement. Despite the unprecedented fear and uncertainty within the law 
enforcement community, and greater community at large, the mayor’s statements did not 
appear to reinforce that feeling. 
The reward announcement resulted in nearly a thousand bad tips within the first 
24 hours. False Dorner sightings were also reported from Denver to Chicago.75 
F. SECONDARY EFFECTS: PUBLIC PERCEPTION 
Rick Braziel, a member of the Police Foundation review panel and former police 
chief for the City of Sacramento, believes that the LAPD also faced a public relations 
crisis because of Dorner’s detailed allegations of discrimination combined with LAPD’s 
history of racial tension within the department and community.76 The longer the agency 
delayed in responding to, or refuting, Dorner’s claims, the more his allegations were 
amplified and reinforced by sympathetic voices on social media platforms.  
A Facebook page entitled, “I Support Christopher Jordan Dorner,” gained over 
2,000 “likes” in less than a week after the discovery of his manifesto. The creator of the 
page told a reporter that he started the page to steer the conversation away from Dorner’s 
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mental health.77 During a LAPD press conference on February 19, 2013, a week after 
Dorner’s death, Beck reflected on the influence of Dorner’s manifesto.78 “I don’t for a 
minute discount the effect Dorner’s manifesto has had on the reputation of the Los 
Angeles Police Department,” he said. “I do not think it is justified.”79 
On February 9, 2013, a news release was issued by LAPD entitled, “Los Angeles 
Police Chief Charlie Beck’s Statement on Christopher Jordan Dorner.”80 The Chief 
announced that the agency would reopen and review the Dorner complaint of 2007 and 
any new allegations revealed in the manifesto. “I do this not to appease a murderer. I do it 
to reassure the public that their police department is transparent and fair in all things we 
do.” This release was spawned, in part, by recommendations from the department’s 
psychologist who believed Dorner might hear it and “give him pause.”81 It was also 
intended to maintain the public’s confidence in the agency. “As much as I value our 
success in reducing crime, I value even more our gains in public confidence,” reads the 
statement.  
What this researcher was unable to determine is whether Dorner heard Chief 
Beck’s statements during the manhunt, or those of any other public officials, and if the 
public statements influenced his actions. Dorner is deceased and it does not appear that 
any evidence of his deliberations are available other than his apparent quest to continue 
killing unabated. 
It can be argued that the mainstream media fueled fear through its extensive news 
coverage and sometimes-inflammatory headlines. USA Today, a leading nationwide news 
outlet, published a story on February 11, 2013, entitled, “LAPD: Fugitive Ex-Cop a 
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‘Domestic Terrorist.’” Television news outlets continually broadcast pictures of a 
muscular, clean-cut Dorner in military and police attire carrying a military assault rifle. 
Internationally, a major news outlet overseas in the United Kingdom published a 
story with the headline, “Rampage of a Real-Life Rambo: Fear Grips the U.S. As Ex-
Navy Officer Goes on Killing Spree in Revenge for Being Sacked by LAPD.”82 The 
assertion from this foreign press outlet was that the entirety of the United States was 
gripped with fear. However, Dorner provided explicit identification of his intended 
targets in his Facebook post—mostly individuals associated with the LAPD. Although it 
was anyone’s guess where he was while a fugitive, the actions he took before he was 
captured were consistent with his writings. It is reasonable to conclude that individuals 
living outside the greater Los Angeles area experienced significantly less fear, especially 
those living in remote parts of the state and country. 
G. CHRISTOPHER DORNER MANHUNT ANALYSIS 
The tragic events and unprecedented manhunt for Christoper Dorner created 
extraordinary challenges for law enforcement in the Southern California region. The 
discovery of his online manifesto provided fuel for a dramatic, uncontrolled storyline by 
members of the news media, and created a level of fear that permeated deeply within the 
law enforcement community. When the Los Angeles police chief described the evolving 
situation as “…extremely worrisome and scary, especially to the police officers 
involved…” early in the manhunt, it signaled the seriousness of the unfolding threat to 
the community—a rapidly evolving threat that resulted in quick action by law 
enforcement throughout the region. However, inconsistent coordination in both the 
tactical and public information efforts emerged in the research. 
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1. Building and Maintaining Trust 
As known from the principles and best practices described in Chapter IV, the 
appearance and tone of public officials standing before the media is often more 
influential than the facts provided in written news releases. The police chief and mayor 
had distinct differences in their tone and demeanor during these two separate news 
conferences, which likely caused the public’s conflicting feelings about their safety, 
security, and trust in officials; an important distinction because the goal of gaining the 
public’s trust and cooperation is critical in a crisis.  
The first press conference held by the police department did not emphasize 
empathy or compassion for the victims until the very end of the police chief’s statement. 
As known from best practices, a determination of trust by the public is made within the 
first 30 seconds of a statement. Those watching would witness six minutes of facts before 
they would hear an expression of empathy for Dorner’s victims and families. Based on 
research in risk and crisis communication, people want to know that officials care before 
they care what they know. In fact, the chief appeared more frustrated and angry at the 
circumstances, rebuffed reporters’ specific questions by refusing to engage in a dialog 
about Dorner’s “ramblings on the Internet,” and indirectly referred to Dorner as a 
coward. He said a coordinated effort was underway among law enforcement agencies to 
apprehend Dorner, and that they would stay in constant communication with those 
agencies until he was taken into custody. This statement emphasized their determination, 
which is a key element of building trust. 
2. Delivery of Timely Messages and Information 
Both the Riverside Police Department and LAPD issued written press releases 
within a few hours of confirming that Dorner was their lead suspect. Riverside also held a 
press conference that evening announcing him as a suspect in their murder case. The 
LAPD held their first press conference the next morning, which was a timely delivery of 
information. However, as Dorner continued on his rampage, various law enforcement 
agencies were releasing information about Dorner and his actions independent of the 
LAPD.  
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As with many complex criminal investigations, a struggle ensued between the 
evidentiary value of keeping his manifesto secret and the public’s safety and right to 
know. The media’s unexpected and rapid discovery on Facebook highlighted the 
influence of today’s social media platforms and appears to have expedited the need for 
officials to try and “get ahead” of the story. Dorner took advantage of social media as a 
way to disseminate his story along with favorable photographs that supported his image. 
He, essentially, got the jump on the release of information through Facebook. 
3. Conducting Effective News Conferences 
The news conferences examined in this case study were specific to the LAPD’s 
information events. The agency was consistent with best practices by conducting them at 
LAPD headquarters, where reporters were familiar with their facility and 
accommodations. However, the distance between downtown Los Angeles and the Big 
Bear community of San Bernardino County created challenges for reporters and news 
organizations. San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department public information officials 
conducted their news conferences three times a day outside their command post in Big 
Bear. They were unaware of what was happening at the LAPD and no apparent 
coordination occurred between public information events.83 LAPD’s press conferences 
were organized and officials appeared to be reading from prepared talking points or 
notes. During the press conference announcing a $1 million reward, the mayor was also 
reading from prepared notes and a consistent order of speakers was providing facts in 
short speaking sessions. 
4. Guiding and Encouraging Appropriate Attitudes, Decisions, Actions 
and Behaviors 
In each press conference and information product provided, law enforcement 
officials and leaders urged the public to report any sightings of Dorner by calling 9-1-1, 
and provide any tips through a special crime stoppers number. The purpose of 
announcing the $1 million reward was to motivate the public, and anyone who might be 
complicit in the actions of Dorner, to come forward and provide information that would 
                                                 
83 Bachman, telephone discussion. 
 52
lead to the arrest and conviction of Dorner. Interestingly, this type of incentivizing of 
public tips can also create its own problems. Often, officials experience inaccurate tips 
and speculation that can distract from their efforts to capture a fugitive. It is uncertain if 
officials deliberated the unintended consequences of providing such an attractive reward 
amount. 
5. Coordination and Collaboration 
Dorner’s rampage lasted nine days and was the focus of local, national and 
international news. Initial efforts to respond to the media were handled individually by 
each respective agency in the first few days. However, the multi agency coordination 
group recognized a gap and made the process of coordinating public information and 
responses to the media one its key objectives. It is unclear whether the joint information 
center process was consistent with SEMS/NIMS best practices or if it had a beneficial 
effect on their public messaging outcomes. 
The lack of a consistent, repeated visual representation of solidarity and 
coordination among law enforcement agencies, as well as the singular dissemination of 
information on an agency-by-agency basis, was not consistent with the best practices 
described in the literature review, which is likely to have reduced the effectiveness of 
crisis communication efforts to reassure the public and reduce anxiety. A “culture of self 
reliance” was identified by an independent review conducted by the Police Foundation, 
which identified that the agencies involved in the Dorner manhunt were reticent to ask for 
help or rely on each other as was evident in discussions with both the public information 
officers in charge at the Riverside Police Department and San Bernardino County 
Sheriff’s Department.  
6. Advanced Planning and Practice 
The greater Los Angeles and Long Beach area received $643,673,390 in urban 
area security initiative (UASI) funding between 2002–2012. The purpose of these funds 
is to help first responders prepare for, prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks and other 
disasters. The UASI grant program is designed to distribute federal funding to an urban 
region composed of multiple local governments and first responder agencies rather than a 
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single city. The purpose of the UASI program is to support regional collaboration among 
local jurisdictions and emergency response organizations.84 Although the Los Angeles 
UASI has spent a significant amount of grant dollars on anti-terrorism related programs 
and equipment, it is unclear whether any significant multi-agency exercises or trainings 
that focused on risk and crisis communication in multi-jurisdiction incidents like they 
faced with Dorner have been conducted. 
A multi-agency joint disaster planning effort in the greater Los Angeles Area is 
also managed by a regional catastrophic planning team (RCPT).85 Their mission is to 
increase the emergency management capabilities of government, nonprofit, and 
community stakeholders within the five OA region, including Los Angeles, Orange, 
Riverside, San Bernardino, Santa Barbara, and Ventura. This effort is focused primarily 
on response to catastrophic natural disasters. 
Based on the police foundation report and discussions with some of the officials 
directly involved in public information efforts in Riverside and San Bernardino County, it 
does not appear that any significant joint information system or center exercises or 
training occurred prior to Dorner’s rampage. In fact, some confusion arose among those 
on the front line of public information efforts about the actual function of a JIC for this 
purpose. 
7. Focus on LAPD and Press Conferences 
It is important to acknowledge that the manhunt for Dorner was much more 
complex than the selected public information events described in this case study. Other 
agencies played an important role in providing critical public information during various 
local incidents, such as the murders and attempted murders in Corona, Irvine, Riverside, 
and the San Bernardino County mountain community where Dorner was eventually 
cornered. Their efforts included press conferences, press releases, individual interviews 
by officials within those jurisdictions, and other efforts to provide timely public 
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information. This research focused on the efforts of the largest law enforcement agency, 
LAPD, and specifically, on the press conferences conducted while Dorner was still on the 
loose. Due to the limited focus of this research, the efforts of other agencies are respected 
and left for additional research and recommendations. 
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VI. BOSTON MARATHON, BOMBINGS AND MANHUNT 
Each year, the City of Boston, Massachusetts hosts the world’s oldest annually 
contested marathon on the anniversary of Patriots’ Day—the third Monday in April. The 
26.2-mile course winds its way through streets in eight cities and towns, and finishes in a 
densely populated area of downtown Boston. The race attracts more than 500,000 
spectators, which makes it one of the most widely viewed sporting events in New 
England.86 This event is the second largest single day sporting event in the world, 
surpassed only by the Super Bowl. It is a high-profile event that receives extensive media 
coverage with more than 1,100 media members, represents more than 250 news outlets, 
and credentialed by race officials each year. In 2013, officials estimated over 23,000 
runners from around the world participated in that year’s race.87  
At approximately 2:49 pm on April 15, 2013, the crowd’s excitement and 
jubilation was extinguished in an instant when two explosions occurred 550 feet apart 
from each other near metal barriers where hundreds of spectators were watching runners 
approaching the finish line. Chaos ensued as thousands fled the smoke filled scene. Over 
300 people suffering from amputated limbs, uncontrolled bleeding, and gruesome injuries 
were taken to area hospitals. Three people, including an 8-year-old boy, lost their lives. 
Police say it was a premeditated attack on innocent citizens using low-grade explosives 
housed in pressure cookers.88 Although authorities knew it had to be an intentional act, 
they were unable to identify a motive or who was responsible quickly.  
As might be expected, fear and uncertainty gripped much of the city as three days 
passed with many unanswered questions despite intense investigative work by federal, 
state and local authorities. In the vacuum of significant official information, the media 
and amateur digital forensic analysts online began trying to identify who may be 
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responsible for the explosions using the power of distributed problem solving, or 
“crowdsourcing.” 89 Internet communities collected and compared online photos and 
videos from the event and published pictures of their own alleged suspects, and created 
speculative storylines about what happened.90 This dissemination of information led to 
uncontrolled rumormongering and resulted in innocent individuals being wrongly 
targeted in the court of public opinion. The media fueled speculation with wall-to-wall 
live news coverage featuring former law enforcement officials and terrorism experts who 
conjectured about every aspect of the event.91 This reaction is symptomatic of the 
public’s widespread access to the Internet, mobile devices, and free social media tools.  
On Thursday, April 18, the New York Post published a front-page photo of two 
men at the marathon under the headline “Bag Men” and implied that the two were prime 
suspects, although they were not the same men on which law enforcement officials were 
focused.92 The FBI was then prompted to publish blurry photos of their suspects 
reluctantly that evening and ask for the public’s help in identifying them.93  
The FBI’s images were widely rebroadcast on television, in newspapers and 
throughout the Internet. Within hours of their public release, two heavily armed suspects 
allegedly murdered an MIT campus police officer, carjacked a citizen, and stole his sport 
utility vehicle (SUV), and lead police on a chase and violent shootout in Watertown that 
left one suspect dead and another on the run. Police believed they were the suspects 
connected to the marathon bombings because small, improvised explosive devices were 
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thrown at pursuing police officers and they found evidence of a similar explosive 
contained in a pressure cooker at the scene.94  
Hundreds of heavily armed law enforcement officers searched for the remaining 
at-large suspect throughout the early morning hours of Friday, April 19, and went door-
to-door in Watertown neighborhoods. Life in the greater Boston area was halted after 
Governor Deval Patrick decided all public transit would be suspended and asked people 
to shelter in place in Watertown and the greater Boston area.95 Schools and universities 
closed and the normally bustling inner city became a virtual ghost town that day.  
It would not be until later that evening when a citizen’s tip led authorities to the 
second suspect as he was hiding in a boat behind a residence in Watertown. Despite many 
false media reports of a suspect in custody earlier in the afternoon, the Boston Police 
Department was the first to announce an official arrest on Twitter at around 8:45 pm, 
“@Boston_Police CAPTURED!!! The hunt is over. The search is done. The terror is 
over. And justice has won. Suspect in custody.” 
A. READINESS AND COORDINATION 
Investments in preparedness, training and response over the years provided an 
important foundation for the public safety response to the tragic events of April 15. Many 
of the capabilities demonstrated in Boston and elsewhere were enabled through the 
preparedness suite of homeland security grant programs (HSGP), including the UASI 
grant program and the state homeland security program (SHSP), according to 
congressional testimony by Richard Serino, Deputy Administrator, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA).96 Between 2002 and 2013, the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts has received more than $943 million in FEMA preparedness grant funds. 
Since 2003, Boston has received more than $369 million through eight grant programs, 
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including $179 million through UASI grants. The Boston Police Commissioner credited 
previous Urban Shield training with Boston’s law enforcement and medical professionals 
as one of the most important preparation steps. He also noted that federally funded 
technology, such as command posts, armored vehicles, robots, harbor patrol vehicles, 
allowed police to capture the final suspect alive.97 
In January, the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) brought 
together a multi-agency, multi-discipline team to develop operational plans for the 
upcoming race.98 That working group identified worst-case scenarios and conducted a 
table-top exercise a few weeks before the event.  
The Director of MEMA credits, “A longstanding commitment to and 
implementation of multi-agency, multi-discipline, and multi-jurisdictional training and 
exercises throughout the state,” and “A strong record of collaboration, coordination and 
cooperation by public officials and public safety leaders,” for the performance of first 
responders before, during, and after the marathon bombings and manhunt.99 The 
relationship between public safety leaders and public officials was described as “open, 
positive and constructive.” Decisions by public safety leaders were regularly 
communicated to elected officials and “reflected public safety concerns, needs and 
objectives.”  
On the day of the bombings, a MACC was already operating in the Massachusetts 
Emergency Operations Center to coordinate activities related to the marathon. It 
contained over 80 representatives from state and federal public safety agencies, along 
with members of the Boston’s police, fire and emergency medical service (EMS) 
services. Other key public safety personnel from the seven cities and towns along the race 
route were part of the MACC. Early in the response, the Boston Police Department’s 
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Chief Information Officer set up a daily phone call at 9am to understand what would be 
happening that day. A Joint JIC with representatives from each agency was also set up to 
handle media inquiries, coordinate consistent messages between agencies, and plan for 
news conferences. The JIC also coordinated the strategy for news conferences including 
pre-meetings to make decisions about who was going to speak, who was going to be on 
the podium, and the point of the news conference.100 
As a result of the explosions, a criminal investigation was led by the FBI and 
involved over 120 federal, state and local law enforcement, and partner agencies. The 
Massachusetts State Police was the lead local law enforcement and public safety 
organization. The Massachusetts Emergency Operations Center was the designated 
operations center. 
While public safety leaders applauded the overall cooperative spirit of law 
enforcement officials at command posts and crime scenes, Boston’s Police Commissioner 
expressed dissatisfaction with the local joint terrorism task force (JTTF). He said, “there 
is a gap with information sharing at a higher level while there are still opportunities to 
intervene in the planning of these terrorist events.”101 
B. THE FIRST OFFICIAL STATEMENTS 
As a matter of procedure, the Boston Police Department routinely uses its online 
website and news blog as a primary tool to disseminate public information.102 At the time 
of the bombing, it received an average of 30,000 monthly views and was a popular source 
for news media.103 However, due to the overwhelming demand for information in the 
hours following the bombings, its website crashed. The department’s public information 
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bureau chief decided to use an alternative method of disseminating information—
Twitter—in the immediate aftermath of the bombings. Twitter is a free, online social 
networking and microblogging service that enables users to send and read “tweets,” 
which are text messages limited to 140 characters. 
The first official message was sent from @bostonpolice stating, “Boston Police 
confirming explosion at marathon finish line with injuries. #tweetfromthebeat via 
@CherylFiandaca.” 
 
Figure 3.  Boston Police Department, 2013, Tweet Confirming Explosion  
at Marathon Finish Line104  
The agency provided 10 additional updates using Twitter in the first 90 
minutes.105 The public and the news media were hungry for official information and 
quickly relied upon the police department’s updates through that social networking 
platform. Officials would post 148 Tweets during the five-day manhunt, many of which 
were re-Tweeted hundreds of times by news outlets and the general public. The agency 
went from approximately 40,000 followers before the bombings to more than 300,000 by 
the end of the crisis.106 Boston’s Police Commissioner would later testify before the 
Senate saying, “We learned that social media gave us the immediate ability to correct 
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misinformation and break news. Even news outlets were waiting for our Twitter 
information before they reported on developments.”107  
The first official press conference was held at 4:50 pm on April 15, 2013, at the 
Westin Hotel, less than a block from where the bombings occurred two hours earlier.108 
Most major news outlets including CNN covered it live. Massachusetts Governor Patrick 
Deval began by describing the incident as a “horrific attack,” briefly explained how they 
would provide information, and introduced Boston’s Police Commissioner Ed Davis.109  
 
Figure 4.  First Press Conference after Marathon Explosions (The Boston Globe)110 
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Figure 5.  First Press Conference after Marathon Explosions (CNN)111 
The commissioner was flanked by at least 10 other officials from various agencies 
and departments, such as the FBI, Massachusetts State Police and National Guard, 
Boston Fire Department, and others. Five representatives were in official agency 
uniforms. The commissioner spoke from a lectern wearing a button down shirt covered 
by a blue jacket with the Boston Police Department logo on the chest. He began by 
providing factual details, such as the time, location and that, “simultaneous explosions 
occurred 50 to 100 yards apart and resulted in multiple casualties.” His tone was serious 
and matter-of-fact, and he did not appear to be reading from any prepared remarks or 
talking points. He described the initial actions of first responders and his efforts to 
coordinate with allied agencies. 
Less than two minutes into the press conference, the commissioner made a 
connection between the marathon explosions and an incident three miles away at the JFK 
Presidential Library and Museum. “We have, at this point in time, determined that there 
has been a third incident that has occurred. There was an explosion that occurred at the 
JFK library… We are not certain these incidents are related, but we are treating them as if 
they are,”112 he said. Media outlets listening to Boston police and fire radio transmissions 
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had already been reporting an “incendiary device” at the library, which caused many in 
the public to believe multiple attacks were happening throughout the city. This 
information turned out to be incorrect as officials later determined an unrelated 
mechanical fire was burning at the library that happened to be coincidental.113  
The commissioner then warned people to stay home and not to congregate in 
large crowds. He announced two public information telephone numbers, one for families 
affected and another for crime tips. He ended his four minutes of remarks by saying, 
“People should be calm, but they should understand that this is an ongoing event, and 
they should understand that we need all the information we can get available to us. Thank 
you.”114  
The commissioner’s statements can be characterized as the following. 
 Appearing concerned, serious and official 
 Unscripted and authentic 
 Providing few incident facts (e.g., no casualty count, identified suspects or 
motives) 
 Speculative (connecting JFK incident to downtown explosions) 
 Providing call to action for the public (e.g., stay home, not congregate in 
crowds, provide tips) 
The governor returned to the lectern with remarks about his conversation with the 
President of the United States, and urged people not to congregate in crowds and that 
they needed tips from the public. He and the commissioner then answered nearly a dozen 
clarifying questions about potential suspect vehicles, number of casualties and details of 
the library incident. One reporter asked if officials were describing this event as a 
“terrorist attack.” The commissioner responded, “We’re not being definitive on this right 
now. You can reach your own conclusions based upon what happened.”115 The press 
conference lasted approximately eight minutes. 
                                                 





C. PRESS CONFERENCE UPDATE: DETERMINATION AND EMPATHY 
EMERGES 
Later that evening, officials held a second press conference at the Westin 
Hotel.116 A slightly larger group of officials, including federal agency representatives, 
joined the governor. This time, he appeared to be reading from notes and described that 
federal, state and local agencies were coordinating together in an active investigation. He 
said the City of Boston will be open the next day, but it “will not be business as usual.” 
He asked everyone to be on a heightened state of vigilance and to report suspicious 
activity to law enforcement. Then he expressed determination and optimism:  
We’re going to get through this… I can tell you from the President to the 
members of our congressional delegation, to many many fellow governors 
who have called to check in, to all of the leaders in law enforcement here 
in the state, at the local level and at the federal level, we are all coming 
together to do everything we can to get to the bottom of this.117 
 
Figure 6.  Press Conference Updates, Boston Marathon Explosions118 
The supervisory agent in charge of the FBI’s Boston field office then came to the 
lectern and began by announcing “the most important fact” is that his agency is asserting 
federal jurisdiction and taking the lead in the investigation. He emphasized that it is a 
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“potential terrorist investigation” and urged “a heightened state of vigilance” in the 
Boston area, and repeated a plea for public tips.119  
At nearly eight minutes into the press conference, the Boston Police 
Commissioner took the stage and began by offering a statement of compassion and 
determination. 
On behalf of Mayor Menino, I’d like to offer my sympathies to the victims 
and the families of this horrendous event. This cowardly act will not be 
taken in stride, we will turn every rock over to find the people who are 
responsible for this.120 
The Suffolk County District Attorney also spoke at the podium and read from 
prepared remarks. He described how he and other top public safety leaders had just 
returned from a tour of the “large and disturbing scene.” He also expressed empathy and 
determination by saying, “Much like you, I’m praying for the victims and their loved 
ones. This is a terrible, terrible day for them. They, and the public at large, can count on 
our very best and seamless work in the days to come.”121  
Overall, the statements made by officials can be characterized as the following. 
 Realistic (e.g., not business as usual) 
 Scripted and focused 
 Empathetic and compassionate 
 Determined and optimistic (e.g., we are going to get through this) 
 Providing call to action for the public (e.g., heightened state of vigilance) 
Officials then took questions, rebuffing several specific questions from reporters 
about the criminal investigation. The press conference lasted for 14 minutes.  
D. DEBATE ABOUT PUBLICLY RELEASING SUSPECT PHOTOS 
Minutes after the explosions, one of the first priorities of the Boston Police 
Department was to begin collecting surveillance video from businesses near the finish 
                                                 





line. Investigators reviewed hundreds of images and dozens of videotape recordings. 
“Within a day or so, we identified an individual who was very suspicious. He appeared to 
have a package with him, he put the package down, and we realized that this was, most 
likely, the bomber,” said Commissioner Davis.122  
Initially, the FBI decided not to release images they uncovered of the men they 
thought were responsible, in part, because they were hoping to identify them on their own 
and make an arrest.123 Secrecy of the visual evidence would be maintained, only to be 
revealed later in court. However, the vacuum of information and lack of an identified 
suspect led to a virtual Wild West of amateur detective work, and spiraled into a witch-
hunt by the media and the public. Innocent citizens were being wrongly associated with 
the crime and investigators felt compelled to release images of their yet-to-be identified 
suspects. Considerable debate occurred within the investigative team about the pros and 
cons of releasing these images. U.S. Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. and Director 
Robert S. Mueller III of the FBI were directly involved in the decision to release the 
images.124 
On Thursday, April 18 at around 5:30 the FBI held a news conference and 
released several images of two men they identified as “suspect 1” and “suspect 2.” 
Referring to the slew of misidentified suspects being published online and in the media, 
FBI Special Agent in Charge Richard DesLauriers told reporters, “For clarity, these 
images should be the only ones—the only ones—that the public should view to assist us. 
Other photos should not be deemed credible and unnecessarily divert the public’s 
attention in the wrong direction and create undue work for vital law enforcement 
resources.”125  
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Officials received thousands of citizen tips from around the country as a result. 
However, their fears were realized when the release of photos set off an extraordinary 
chain of events later that evening. 
E. WATERTOWN MANHUNT LEADS TO COMMUNITY LOCKDOWN 
While Boston residents remained gripped by an eerie silence since Monday’s 
bombings, a neighborhood across the Charles River in the small community of 
Watertown was jolted awake by the sounds of gunfire and explosives early Friday 
morning. Shortly after midnight, law enforcement found the two men they believed to be 
the prime suspects in the marathon bombings. They were seen driving in a stolen vehicle 
in a densely populated residential neighborhood. Less than two hours earlier, officials 
allege they carjacked a Mercedes SUV, bragging to the driver they are the Marathon 
bombers.126 It is believed that the suspects also murdered a Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) police officer in an abort effort to steal his gun.127 
Once the suspects knew police were closing in on them, a gunfight erupted 
between authorities and the heavily armed men. Hundreds of rounds were fired between 
the police and suspects. They threw several improvised explosive devices at officers in 
their attempt to flee. Eventually, one suspect was mortally wounded when his accomplice 
ran him over with their getaway vehicle, and was later pronounced dead at a local 
hospital. The second suspect ran from the scene without being captured. 
Hundreds of law enforcement officers converged on Watertown in search of the 
remaining suspect at large. Residents were told to stay in-doors and remain vigilant as the 
hours passed with no sign of the second suspect. At an early morning press conference, 
Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick announced a decision to lock down Watertown 
and the surrounding areas, including Boston, with a shelter-in-place request. “We’re 
asking people to shelter in place,” Patrick said. “In other words, to stay indoors with their 
doors locked, and not to open their door for anyone other than a properly identified law 
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enforcement officer.”128 Courthouses were shut down, area schools were closed, public 
transit ceased and the Federal Aviation Administration instituted a no-fly-zone over the 
Watertown area.129 After a day of intense searching with no luck, officials held a press 
conference on the streets of Watertown that evening. They decided to lift the shelter-in-
place despite the public’s continuing anxiety and fear.  
Consistent with the organization of other press conferences held by officials 
earlier in the week, the governor began by explaining what authorities would talk about 
and then turned the stage over to law enforcement leaders. Rather than the FBI being the 
predominant agency, the Massachusetts State Police accounted for a majority of this 
briefing. Standing before a bank of news microphones wearing his official police uniform 
and hat, Colonel Timothy Alben of the state was flanked by more than a dozen local, 
state and federal officials. 
 
Figure 7.  Boston Manhunt News Conference: Local, state and federal officials  
support Superintendent of Massachusetts State Police  
Col. Timothy Alben (right) at the podium130  
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Figure 8.  Boston Manhunt News Conference: Col. Timothy Alben speaks 131 
He began by thanking the community for being patient and acknowledged how 
tired everyone was. In a professional and determined tone, he reassured the public, 
“…But we remain committed to this. We do not have an apprehension of our suspect this 
afternoon. But we will have one. We’re committed to that.”132 
His two-minute statement included an explanation of how tactical teams had 
searched door-to-door looking for the suspect, and additional forensic work was being 
completed at local crime scenes. He emphasized the continuing presence of law 
enforcement in Watertown was to assure the safety of the people in the community. At 
the end of his statement, he repeated law enforcement’s determination to end the reign of 
terror the community had been enduring. He appeared slightly emotional, perhaps 
expressing grief and anger, and said, “But for the sake of everyone that were hurt or 
killed during the marathon or those police officers that lost their life or were seriously 
injured, we are committed to seeing a conclusion to this case. Thank you.”133 
The press conference, broadcast live on major news outlets, continued for more 
than 15 minutes with statements from the governor, Mayor of Boston and Watertown 
Police Chief.134 The governor announced that they were lifting the shelter-in-place 
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request, but asked the public to remain vigilant. Boston’s Mayor thanked the public for 
their cooperation and reassured the public, “But together, we will get through this crisis.” 
Watertown’s Police Chief thanked the community of Watertown and asked people to “go 
about your business,” acknowledging that many events were occurring in their city the 
next day.135  
Reporters asked officials more than 27 questions focused on a wide range of 
details about the suspects, shootout, and overall bombing investigation. The 
superintendent responded to almost all the questions, but avoided specifics about the 
FBI’s investigation, and repeated the message to the public to be vigilant and report any 
suspicious activity. He was also asked what his message was for the suspect. The 
superintendent responded, “My message to the suspect is to give himself up, to stop any 
further violence towards anyone.”136 
Overall, the statements made by officials can be characterized as the following. 
 Determined and reassuring (e.g., we will have an apprehension) 
 Optimistic (e.g., together we will get through this) 
 Unscripted remarks but coordinated messages 
 Empathetic and compassionate 
 Repeating call to action for the public (e.g., heightened state of vigilance) 
Shortly after this press conference, and just a few blocks away, a resident notified 
authorities he found blood on his boat parked on a trailer in his backyard, which turned 
out to be where the remaining 19-year-old suspect was hiding. Police engaged in another 
flurry of gunfire with the suspect as he holed up in the boat. Eventually, tactical teams 
forced him out at gunpoint and took him into custody alive—putting an end to the tragic, 
five-day reign of terror that besieged the greater Boston area. 
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F. BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING ANALYSIS 
Officials in Boston faced the challenge of responding to a plausible worst-case 
scenario of terrorism at a highly public, large-scale event. The premeditated attack on 
innocent people at the Boston Marathon finish line, and deadly manhunt that followed, 
which caused a prolonged heightened level of fear and uncertainty in the greater Boston 
area—arguably on a similar, but distinctly different, level as the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001. The repeated broadcasts of eyewitness video of the explosions, 
along with gruesome high definition images of carnage and human suffering, permeated 
far beyond the boundaries of Massachusetts. Communities throughout the nation watched 
and wondered if they would be next. The pressure on law enforcement to identify those 
responsible and apprehend them as quickly as possible was tremendous. So much so, that 
President Obama issued an emergency declaration for the State of Massachusetts and 
called for increased security throughout the United States.137 He also directed a massive 
federal response to Boston, and committed the full resources of the federal government to 
help investigate. 
1. Building and Maintaining Trust 
Although the Boston Police Chief did not offer a clear expression of empathy or 
compassion in this first appearance before news media cameras and microphones on the 
day of the bombings, a visible appearance of multi-agency coordination, determination 
and authority of the speakers was apparent. The individuals standing behind the podium 
were all familiar leaders of their various city and state public safety organizations. The 
failure by the Police Chief to provide a clear expression of empathy or compassion at the 
first Boston news conference was a lost opportunity. As known from the research in risk 
and crisis communication, the ability to build trust, and reduce irrational actions by the 
public, is highly dependent on the primacy of expressions of caring, compassion, and 
empathy for those affected. The adage in crisis communication is, “people want to know 
that you care, before they care what you know.” However, a deliberate effort to display 
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and reinforce empathy and compassion emerged from leadership in Boston only at 
subsequent news conferences that evening and throughout the week. 
During the press conferences examined in this case study, leaders provided factual 
information about what they knew at the time and were transparent about what they did 
not know, which is a best practice recommended in virtually all the literature on risk and 
crisis communication. A conscious decision was also made to switch the lead 
spokesperson from the FBI to the Colonel of the Massachusetts State Police when press 
conferences were held in the community of Watertown that done to reassure residents 
that a familiar face in state law enforcement was managing the law enforcement actions 
happening in their neighborhoods.  
2. Delivery of Timely Messages and Information 
The public anticipates that officials may not have all the answers in the middle or 
the immediate aftermath of a crisis. In some cases, the lack of significant facts causes a 
reticence among public officials to provide timely announcements and releases of 
information. In the case of the Boston Police Department, its pre-existing diversity of 
public information delivery tools, such as Twitter and Facebook, and quick thinking on 
behalf of its public information bureau chief, led to successful game changing methods of 
communication that allowed for the quick dissemination of information as evidenced by 
the media’s quick reliance on their @bostonpolice Twitter account and significant 
“retweeting” of official information by journalists, allied agencies, and the general public. 
Its ability to think quickly and take advantage of tools to about its information in the 
public arena rapidly allowed for the delivery of official messages. Waiting for an official 
press release or press conference is likely to lead to early speculation and a scramble to 
“catch up” to the storyline formed by unofficial sources or the news media. 
3. Conducting Effective News Conferences 
The first official press conference was held at 4:50 pm on April 15, 2013, at the 
Westin Hotel, less than a block from where the bombings occurred two hours earlier, 
which maximized the ability for news media to continue covering the aftermath at the 
finish line and conveniently receive updates on the actions of public safety organizations. 
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Regularly scheduled press conferences were held each day, even if no new information 
was available, to allow the media to ask questions about issues that emerged. The room 
selected for the press conferences was large enough to handle the number of officials 
needed to be behind the podium, as well as the numerous print, radio, and television 
journalists covering the story. The room also provided access to news organizations 
satellite trucks parked outside, which afforded the ability for live coverage. This set up is 
important because it allows for direct dissemination to the public at the time information 
is available, rather than journalists recording and editing sound bites that may be taken 
out of context. 
The conduct at the news briefings was also consistent with best practices. The 
Governor gave a brief formal opening about the basic who, what, when, where and why 
answers in the first few minutes of the press briefing. The overall appearance of the 
coordinated press conferences provided a reassurance that officials were in control. 
4. Coordination and Collaboration 
The response to the Boston Marathon bombings benefitted from the extensive 
event coordination conducted prior to the attacks. They were ready with a thoroughly 
exercised MACC at the Massachusetts Emergency Operations Center where most 
activities related to the marathon were coordinated. It contained over 80 representatives 
from state and federal public safety agencies, along with members of the Boston’s police, 
fire, and EMS services. Other key public safety personnel from the seven cities and towns 
along the race route were part of the MACC. 
The existence of a clearly defined JIC with representatives from each agency set 
up to handle media inquiries, coordinate consistent messages between agencies, and plan 
for news conferences, is a model of best practices in emergency crisis communication. 
Unlike the non-specific JIC set up in the Dorner investigation, Boston’s coordinated the 
strategy for news conferences to include pre-meetings to make decisions about who is 
going to speak, who is going to be on the podium, and the point of the news conference to 
allow consistency in the dissemination of messages critical to public safety as events 
continued to unfold. 
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5. Guiding and Encouraging Appropriate Decision and Actions 
When law enforcement authorities were unable to locate the at-large suspect in 
Watertown, they chose to make that announcement despite an extreme level of fear and 
anxiety among the general public. It was wise for leaders to agree to let local public 
safety officials make this announcement (as opposed to the FBI that made it clear it were 
“in charge” earlier in the week) as they were more likely to be known and trusted by the 
community. Their repeated reassurances of focus on the safety of the community, and 
enlistment of the public’s help to provide tips (reducing their feeling of helplessness), 
was also consistent with best practices. 
At each press briefing, they also emphasized that the public should provide any 
information they had to authorities and be alert and vigilant to provide an appropriate 
action for the public who was experiencing fear, lack of control and anxiety. 
6. Advanced Planning and Practice 
Thankfully, it appears that previous significant investments in public safety 
planning, training, exercising, response, and recovery benefitted the community in the 
hours and days that followed the initial attack. Although it is unclear how much training 
public officials may have received in risk and crisis communication, the overall effect of 
building and maintaining close relationships between agencies allowed for a consistent 
effort to display leadership, coordination and effectiveness publicly throughout most of 
the response. The same core group of leaders appeared in unity at all major press 
conferences. They were also very familiar with each other as they had been involved in 
other events and had worked closely together in the planning and coordination of major 
events, such as previous Boston Marathons, political conventions, and large sporting 
venues at which security coordination was essential. 
7. Focus on Public Information Actions during Height of Fear and 
Uncertainty 
It should be noted that several other releases of public information in the form of 
individual interviews, press briefings, written news releases by authorities were 
available—a significant press conference immediately following the capture of the final 
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suspect. This research focused on select events and individual actions of key public 
officials during the height of fear and uncertainty. Due to the limitations of this research, 
undocumented efforts not included, but related to the overall event, are left for further 
research and examination. 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The case studies and events examined in this research have provided valuable 
real-world insight into the complexities and challenges of communicating during a 
contemporary high-profile crisis. Based primarily on the best practices described in 
Chapter IV—Principles and Best Practices—the following are key recommendations for 
leaders who are likely to face similar high consequence events in the future.  
As known from the research, high levels of trust can reduce social uncertainty and 
complexity, and influence risk perceptions and acceptance of risks. The public typically 
judges the trustworthiness of a message based on its content and source. “Who is telling 
me this?” and “Can I trust them?” As a matter of best practice, public officials need to 
express appropriate care, compassion, and empathy as a first order of business during a 
press conference or in a written statement. All too often officials jump right into 
providing facts and figures and never clearly articulate that they care—or sometimes 
subjugate that to the end of their statement as witnessed at the first official press 
conferences conducted by officials in both the Boston Marathon Bombing and the Dorner 
Manhunt. They jumped right into the facts and showed far less compassion and empathy 
than would have been most effective, which did change over time, however. It is 
important to understand that over 50 percent of public officials’ credibility will be 
dependent upon whether or not they are perceived as empathetic and caring.138 In most 
communications, the audience will decide this credibility in the first 9–30 seconds. The 
higher the level of the audience’s emotion or distrust, the more officials will need to 
communicate consistently that they are listening, that they care, and that they are 
empathetic. Research has shown a long-term erosion of public confidence and trust in 
government over the past few decades.139 This erosion creates a challenge for public 
                                                 
138 Ken Makovsky, “Communications in High Stress Environments,” Forbes, October 3, 2013, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenmakovsky/2013/10/03/1159/. 
139 Richard G. Peters, Vincent T. Covello, and David B. McCallum. “The Determinants of Trust and 
Credibility in Environmental Risk Communication: An Empirical Study,” Risk Analysis 17, no. 1 (1997): 
49. 
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officials communicating during an emergency. The goal is to build trust and galvanize the 
population to take a positive action or avoid harm.140  
This topic cannot be over emphasized. Officials need to understand that their 
“human side” is extremely important to, and expected by, the public in uncertain and 
stressful times. Re-examining the communications blunders of BP CEO Tony Hayward is 
a primary example of lack of empathy and understanding, which leads causes the public 
to distrust what officials are saying during a crisis that, effectively, renders the veracity of 
those statements as irrelevant. 
A. FOCUS SPECIFICALLY ON CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS BEST 
PRACTICES FOR LEADERSHIP 
The best practices identified in this thesis emphasize the role of advanced 
planning and practice. Inherent in that role is the development of specific training on risk 
and crisis communication—not just how to write a press release or conduct a media 
interview. Having a plan is important, but its effectiveness is dependent on the 
knowledge and training of those likely to engage in risk and crisis communication. Public 
officials and leaders should receive specially tailored training that familiarizes them with 
the limitations of the public’s understanding of messages when faced with a crisis, and 
why existing communication methods used in non-emergencies may not be effective or 
appropriate. Key differences exist between routine local emergencies and high-profile 
regional incidents, such as the Dorner manhunt and the bombings of the Boston 
Marathon. Most notably, the highest-level public safety leaders and elected officials 
become the focus of media attention, rather than designated public information officers 
from specific agencies, which might be a deliberate choice based on the hierarchy of 
government, an expectation of the public, or an on-the-fly choice based on the 
circumstances. Elected public officials who are not regularly involved in, or familiar 
with, public safety responses are likely to become the focus of the media’s attention, 
which can cause problems for first responders and the general public if their statements 
                                                 
140 Barbara Reynolds and Sandra Crouse Quinn, “Effective Communication During an Influenza 
Pandemic: The Value of Using a Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication Framework,” Health 
Promotion Practice 9, no. 4 suppl (2008): 13S-17S, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1524839908325267. 
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conflict with the response strategy, or they focus on the wrong objective, such as their 
personal image, or their “15 minutes of fame.” This situation is often due to their lack of 
familiarization and appreciation of best practices in risk and crisis communication. For 
example, California’s Governor’s Office of Emergency Services has created a two-hour 
“public officials training” that attempts to fill this gap. Greater focus by FEMA and 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is needed to emphasize the importance of this 
training. 
B. EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING PRE-EVENT 
PARTNERSHIPS/RELATIONSHIPS 
As seen in the effects of Boston’s pre-event planning and exercises, all public 
safety officials should take advantage of opportunities to build relationships with allied 
agencies and local elected officials through exercises, training, and non-emergency 
events. Part of the best practices emphasizes establishing connections before disaster 
strikes because it allows for discussions about how to mitigate differences in 
understanding between agencies into the communications response. that may seem like 
common sense, but many examples of agencies and organizations working in stovepipes 
are abundant, and they never fully test their ability to work together until a disaster 
happens. In contrast, the coordinated response to the Boston Marathon bombings is an 
effect of strong relationships built long before officials faced the extraordinary challenges 
of that tragic series of events. These connections resulted from their need to collaborate 
on the planning of major events, such as the annual marathon, and significant investments 
in planning and exercises funded by the DHS. In some cases, leaders have said their 
bonds and friendships with other officials are part of Boston’s culture. 
C. DIFFERENTIATE THE TACTICS FROM THE STRATEGIES 
Numerous courses are available on how to conduct successful interviews with 
journalists, write news releases, organize press conferences and set up JISs and JICs, etc. 
The ability to execute these functions and tactics is important, but the strategy behind 
“why” officials deploy these tactics is most important. In high concern events and 
disasters, risk and crisis communication efforts have the potential for significant impacts 
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on the outcome of the event. In the best practices offered in this thesis, the development 
of a communications strategy provides a platform to differentiate the tactics from the 
strategic. Officials should take the time to develop an overall communication strategy for 
the agency that includes the tools, tactics, and outcomes necessary to be successful in 
communicating with the public in both non-crisis and crisis times. Once they have 
developed a strategy, it is equally important to test that strategy on a regular basis through 
table-top exercises and training to identify gaps and ensure familiarity among those who 
will execute it.  
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VIII. CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION 
This thesis has researched the public information and crisis communication efforts 
by officials in two unique, high-profile criminal incidents in 2013. Both these cases 
provide important insight into the challenges faced by public safety officials in a vastly 
different communication environment forever changed by the introduction of the Internet 
and social media. As a practitioner in risk and crisis communication with over 20 years of 
training, experience and first-hand knowledge of some of the most well-known high-
profile events, the researcher is always a keen observer of how well, or not so well, 
officials communicate, in hopes of learning something new and validating the best 
practices described in research. His unique on-the-job experience over the years has laid a 
foundation for his ongoing fascination with not just big events, but complex crises that 
challenge leaders to perform at a high level of communication competency. To 
understand the lens through which he researched and analyzed the two case studies in this 
thesis, it is important to understand what high-profile events have shaped his knowledge 
and interest in risk and crisis communication throughout the years. 
A. YOSEMITE SIGHTSEER MURDERS  
The first major case the researcher experienced as a public information officer 
was the disappearance of three women sightseeing in Yosemite National Park. Between 
February and July 1999, the FBI and several local law enforcement agencies in Northern 
California conducted a multi-agency investigation into their disappearance, and 
ultimately found all three deceased and the victims of murder. The FBI’s special agent in 
charge became the main spokesperson for the task force and was later criticized and 
removed from his post for his handling of the investigation. The researcher vividly recalls 
watching him conduct a press conference in the park the day after a fourth woman, 
unrelated to the original three who disappeared, was found in the park murdered and 
beheaded. Standing in front of dozens of local and national cameras and journalists he 
confidently stated, “We have absolutely no reason to believe there is a connection’’ 
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between the two cases.”141 His statement flew in the face of common sense, regardless of 
its validity, and proved to be one of the researcher’s first stunning examples of poor risk 
and crisis communication. In that instance, he was also able to see how distrust forms in 
the minds journalists, and knew several journalists personally and heard their candid 
criticisms of the FBI. In addition, as the original case unfolded over the course of several 
months, he was able to witness the effects of a lack of information, media hype, 
interagency squabbles, and public grandstanding on the part of many officials and 
opportunists to get their 15 minutes of fame. It taught him a lot about the unique 
dynamics of events that garner unusually high media interest and the importance of 
public trust, or lack thereof. Cary Stayner, a handyman at a lodge just outside Yosemite 
was eventually arrested. He confessed and was convicted of the murder of the four 
women, despite months of intense investigation of completely unrelated individuals 
targeted by the FBI.  
B. CHANDRA LEVY DISAPPEARANCE AND MURDER 
Less than two years later, the researcher would become entwined with the case of 
missing Washington intern Chandra Levy. As the manager of media relations for the 
Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Department, he was assigned to wrangle the hundreds of 
reporters and dozens of cameras that overwhelmed Chandra’s parents home in north 
Modesto, California. Levy’s parents and friends held numerous vigils and news 
conferences in the Modesto area as an attempt to keep her disappearance the top news 
story. 
The press dynamics were similar to what he had experienced in the Yosemite 
case, with one significant exception—the media found a “suspect” and their focus 
became then local Congressman Gary Condit. The drawn-out investigation into her 
disappearance led to media allegations that Condit had an affair with Levy and a cloud of 
suspicion was raised that he might have had something to do with her disappearance. 
National news outlets hired local high school students to sit outside the homes of 
                                                 
141 Christine Hanley, “Yosemite Naturalist Found Dead,” Online Athens, Athens Banner-Herald, July 
24, 1999, http://onlineathens.com/stories/072499/new_0724990005.shtml. 
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Condit’s family and at his work, and report any movements via cell phone. News cameras 
chased members of his staff between their office and restaurants during lunch hours in 
hopes of getting interviews. In addition, Condit himself was seen several times on 
national news broadcasts angrily pushing reporters out of the way, as he tried to get from 
his Washington, DC apartment and the Capitol.  
Although the media’s sensational allegations against Condit were never 
substantiated, and he was eventually cleared by law enforcement of any involvement in 
her disappearance, his terse and combative responses to the persistent media inquiries 
provided the researcher vivid examples of how not to respond in a crisis. Results of a 
national FOX News/Opinion Dynamics poll showed 70 percent thought Condit was not 
telling everything he knew about Levy, and about a quarter of Americans (27 percent) 
thought he should resign his office.142 In an attempt to repair his damaged public image, 
the researcher was in the unique position to personally witness Condit conduct a live, 30-
minute nationally televised interview on ABC with journalist Connie Chung. Although he 
stuck to his talking points and advice from legal advisors, he did not provide the mea 
culpa the public was hoping to hear. An editorial in the New York Times three days after 
the interview read, “…whatever happened between Gary Condit and Chandra Ann Levy, 
a measure of candor from Mr. Condit, even at this late date, would have been the 
principled choice. In fact, when a 24-year-old woman is missing, it’s the only decent 
alternative.”143 Not surprisingly, a nationwide poll conducted after the interview aired 
showed three-quarters of all adults described him as immoral; two-thirds say he was 
uncaring, and 79 percent felt he was dishonest. More than six-in-ten believed it is likely 
that Condit was directly involved in Chandra Levy’s disappearance.144 It would not be 
until nine years later that an unrelated man was arrested by investigators and convicted of 
the murder of Chandra Levy. 
                                                 
142 Dana Blanton, “FOX News/Opinion Dynamics Poll: Condit’s Acting Guilty,” FoxNews.com, July 
27, 2001, http://www.foxnews.com/story/2001/07/27/fox-newsopinion-dynamics-poll-condit-acting-guilty. 
143 Jedediah Purdy, “Gary Condit’s Strong, Silent Act,” The New York Times, August 26, 2001, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/26/opinion/gary-condit-s-strong-silent-act.html. 
144 Keating Holland, “Poll: Condit Media Blitz Falls Short,” CNN, August 27, 2001, http://edition.cnn. 
com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/08/27/cnn.poll.condit/index.html. 
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The Levy case was an eye opener for the researcher. He was able to watch a 
sustained, over-the-top frenzy of local and national media outlets competing against each 
other to maintain the dramatic storyline of a sex scandal and unsolved crime. It also gave 
him the opportunity to see the underbelly of politics, public image, and reputation 
management. This ability alone was a tremendous learning experience as politicians who 
must always worry about their reputation are often intertwined into public safety crises 
like the Boston Marathon bombings and the Christopher Dorner manhunt.  
C. LACI PETERSON DISAPPEARANCE AND MURDER 
In addition to corroborating the adage that “bad things come in threes,” the 
researcher, was chosen by the Superior Court of Stanislaus County to manage the media 
during the early phases of the murder trial of Scott Peterson—accused of murdering his 
wife Laci Peterson and their unborn son in 2002. This case progressed with some of the 
same high-profile-making elements of the Yosemite sightseer and Chandra Levy cases, 
an unfolding drama and unsolved crime, and a solid cast of characters willing to 
speculate with reporters and family members encouraging continuous news media 
coverage. 
The researcher was lucky enough not to have to handle the daily no-new-
information press briefings that his colleagues at the Modesto Police Department endured 
in the days preceding Scott’s arrest. However, as soon as he was taken into custody, the 
entire media establishment quickly shifted its focus to his incarceration and court 
proceedings. On the first day of his arraignment, journalists made over 400 requests to sit 
in the 70-seat courtroom. Jockeying for the best position in front of the courthouse turned 
into a melee between photographers and producers staking their ground on limited 
sidewalk space. Add to that, the network “big gun” celebrities were dispatched to sway 
their stardom in hopes of getting an advantage over other news networks—Maria Shriver 
with Dateline NBC, Katie Couric, Geraldo Rivera, Nancy Grace, and Rita Cosby to name 
a few. 
Taking a page from the book of best practices in risk and crisis communication, 
the exercise of fairness and need for collaboration and agreement among both 
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government entities and the news media was critical to balance the day-to-day court 
operations with the spectacle that was the Peterson trial. A plan was developed on where 
to park large satellite trucks and a map of equal allocation of real estate in front of the 
courthouse for news networks. A daily lottery system was established for the seats in the 
courtroom designated for the media and the public. Weekly meetings with representatives 
of print, radio, and television entities were held to ensure that everyone was on the same 
page and understood the rules. As an experiment in handling the dissemination of court 
information and documents, the researcher collaborated with a friend and created a 
special website called www.pressupdate.info. This website became the foundation 
through which all information was provided to the news media that turned out to be a 
fortuitous experiment in the use of the Internet to provide information in a JIC fashion. 
Perhaps, it is the same sort of experiment in technology the Boston Police Department 
undertook by relying on Twitter as the quickest way to dissemination information to 
hundreds of media outlets simultaneously.  
From the beginning of the Peterson trial, an extreme sensitivity to the effects of 
news stories on the court proceedings was present. However, the litany of criminal justice 
“experts,” spontaneous new “witnesses” and fame seekers from soliciting the news 
producers to fill the endless hours of daily live news coverage was not stopped. Since the 
court issued a gag order on everyone involved in the case, the only source of “new” 
official information was that presented in court during hearing dates. On non-court days, 
these opportunists found their way into news stories and onto television broadcasts. As 
acutely witnessed in the examination of the Boston Marathon bombings and the Dorner 
manhunt, speculation and misinformation created unique challenges for officials trying to 
maintain accurate information throughout the event. 
Eventually, the overwhelming daily media coverage proved to be too much for 
the local court system and a “change of venue” motion by the defense led to the trial 
being moved to the San Francisco bay area for the remainder of the proceedings. With the 
help of many of the researcher’s colleagues, he had managed the daily media onslaught 
from April 2003 to February 2004. He believes these efforts were mostly successful. He 
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has used this experience as a case study and teaching opportunity for leaders who may 
face a similar event in their jurisdiction. 
The culmination of experiences since 1999 has helped solidify the importance of 
the best practices described in the literature and highlighted in this thesis. Understanding 
key principles and practices of building and maintaining trust, delivery of timely 
messages and information, conducting effective news briefings, coordinating and 
collaborating with other entities, and most importantly, advanced planning and 
preparation, are critical lessons for leaders and practitioners. Those faced with the 
challenges and demands of high profile, high consequence events are certain to be judged 
more by their success at communicating effectively before, during, and after the crisis 
than by how well they handle the tactical response. 
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